

## Abrogation Without Replacement in the Qur'an: Rethinking *al-Tadarruj fi al-Tashri'*

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DOI : 10.29240/alquds.v9i2.14364

**Abstract.** This article critically examines the concept of *nasakh* (abrogation) in the Qur'an, with a particular focus on cases where a ruling is interpreted as being abrogated without a clearly defined substitute (*nasakh bilā bada*). Rather than understanding such cases as definitive cancellations, this study proposes that they should be read through the framework of *al-tadarruj fi al-tashri'* (gradual legislation), which conceives of legal revelation as a phased and pedagogical process aligned with the intellectual and spiritual development of the Muslim community. Using a qualitative library-based research design and critical content analysis, the article re-examines key verses—including Q.S. al-Mujādilah [58]:12–13, Q.S. al-Baqarah [2]:184–185, and Q.S. al-Nisā' [4]:15—in their historical and exegetical contexts. The findings demonstrate that these transitions reflect deliberate stages of moral and legal formation rather than normative discontinuity. By foregrounding contextual, historical, and maqāṣid-based dimensions of revelation, the study advances a new interpretive model that reconceptualizes *nasakh* as part of a dynamic and purposive framework of legal development. This approach offers a crucial corrective to rigid classical classifications and contributes to contemporary Qur'anic studies by affirming the continued relevance of divine law in addressing shifting socio-historical realities.

**Keywords:** *Nasakh*; Qur'anic Abrogation; *al-tadarruj fi al-tashri'*; Gradual Legislation; Islamic Law.

## Introduction

Throughout the historical trajectory of Qur'anic revelation, Islamic legal rulings were not delivered instantaneously but unfolded gradually (*tadarruj*), in accordance with the social, psychological, and spiritual conditions of the early Muslim community.<sup>1</sup> Among the most significant features of this gradual process is the concept of *nasakh* (abrogation), whereby an existing ruling (*mansukh*) is replaced or superseded by a later one (*nāsikh*).<sup>2</sup> Legal change in this context should not be viewed as a contradiction, but rather as a marker of flexibility that reflects the maturation of Islamic law and its responsiveness to evolving communal needs.<sup>3</sup> For this reason, *nasakh* has remained a central topic of debate in both classical and contemporary scholarship on Qur'anic interpretation and Islamic legal theory.

Within Islamic scholarly tradition, *nasakh* is generally defined as the annulment of an earlier legal ruling by a subsequent one, either from the same source (the Qur'an) or from another

<sup>1</sup> Fachri Aidulsyah, "The Paradigm of Al-Quran As The Main Element of Islamic Civilization," *Tsaqafah* 16, no. 1 (18 Mei 2020): 127–46, doi:10.21111/tsaqafah.v16i1.3460.

<sup>2</sup> Nashih Muhammad, Eko Sariyeki, dan Sumarjoko Sumarjoko, "Rekatualisasi Nasakh Dalam Perspektif Sosiologis," *Syariat: Jurnal Studi Al-Qur'an Dan Hukum* 8, no. 1 (1 Mei 2022): 53–64, doi:10.32699/syariat.v8i1.2105.

<sup>3</sup> Rahmat Nurdin dan Abdillah Abdillah, "Polemik Nasikh-Mansukh John Burton Dalam 'The Collection of The Quran,'" *PAPPASANG* 5, no. 1 (24 Juni 2023): 1–11, doi:10.46870/jiat.v5i1.534.

authoritative source (the Sunnah).<sup>4</sup> This concept is normatively justified by verses such as Q.S. al-Baqarah [2]:106 and Q.S. an-Nahl [16]:101, which affirm that God may replace one verse with another. However, exegetical debates have emerged over verses that are said to be abrogated yet lack an explicit replacement. This raises a critical question: do these verses indeed represent abrogation without substitution, or are they rather part of a gradual legislative process (*al-tadarruj fi al-tashri'*) aimed at legal refinement over time?<sup>5</sup>

Diverging views on the existence and scope of *nasakh* continue to shape Islamic discourse. On one side, classical scholars such as al-Suyuti and al-Zarqani accepted the idea of *nasakh* without replacement as a manifestation of divine wisdom intended to relieve the legal burden upon the community.<sup>6</sup> Conversely, modern scholars such as Fazlur Rahman and Muhammad Abu Zahrah have challenged literal interpretations of *nasakh*, advocating instead for a contextual approach that situates legal change within broader sociological and philosophical frameworks.<sup>7</sup> These divergent approaches raise a fundamental question: are the seemingly abrogated verses truly nullified in legal terms, or have they undergone a transformation of meaning and function in a different context?

The concept of *nasakh* in the Qur'an has long been a central topic in the fields of Qur'anic sciences and Islamic legal theory. Muslim scholars have sought to understand how apparently conflicting legal rulings within the Qur'an can be reconciled systematically. However, interpretations of *nasakh* vary widely and can be broadly categorized into three major scholarly streams: normative-conceptual analysis, critical-comparative evaluation, and contextual approaches related to the dynamic and progressive nature of Islamic law.

The first stream emphasizes the conceptual and definitional aspects of *nasakh-mansukh*, particularly within the domains of legal reasoning and exegetical methodology. Fatoohi<sup>8</sup> provides a comprehensive theoretical framework on abrogation in Islamic law, while Syaifulloh<sup>9</sup>, Sabrifha and Mochammad Novendri S<sup>10</sup>, and Fadillah and Irham<sup>11</sup> argue that understanding *nasakh* must be aligned with principles of dynamic and flexible legal derivation. Rafi<sup>12</sup> explores Shah Waliullah al-Dahlawi's rationalist view on *nasakh*, while Rofiq<sup>13</sup> delves into the sanad-based exegetical approach employed by Ibn Abi Hatim. Within this paradigm, *nasakh* is understood as a normative mechanism inherent in the early process of legislative formulation.

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<sup>4</sup> Shalahuddin Shalahuddin, "Teori Naskh Mahmoud Muhammad Taha Dan Sumbangsihnya Bagi Pembaruan Hukum Islam Di Dunia Modern," *Al-Mazaahib: Jurnal Perbandingan Hukum* 3, no. 2 (2015): 401–15, doi:10.14421/al-mazaahib.v3i2.2838.

<sup>5</sup> Haris Fadillah dan M. Iqbal Irham, "Nasakh Pembentukan Elastisitas Hukum Islam," *Rayah Al-Islam* 6, no. 2 (28 Oktober 2022): 261–77, doi:10.37274/rais.v6i2.575.

<sup>6</sup> Shofiyulloh Shofiyulloh, "Penalaran Hukum Islam: Upaya Mensinergikan Al-Aslu Dan Al-Far'u," *Matan: Journal of Islam and Muslim Society* 1, no. 1 (22 Oktober 2019): 11–29, doi:10.20884/1.matan.2019.1.1.1903.

<sup>7</sup> Fauzi Fauzi, "The Principles for Ijtihad in Response to the Contemporary Problems," *MIQOT: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 42, no. 2 (17 Juli 2019): 281–99, doi:10.30821/miqot.v42i2.557.

<sup>8</sup> Louay Fatoohi, *Abrogation in the Qur'an and Islamic Law* (New York: Routledge, 2012), doi:10.4324/9780203096208.

<sup>9</sup> Ahmad Syaifulloh, "Nasikh Dan Mansukh: Langkah Ulama' Dalam Memahami Al-Qur'an Dan Hadis," *Jurnal Studi Islam dan Sosial* 1, no. 1 (1 April 2018): 107–27, <https://ejournal.iaikhozin.ac.id/ojs/index.php/iklila/article/view/41>.

<sup>10</sup> Eli Sabrifha dan Mochammad Novendri S, "Implikasi Konsep Naskh Dan Mansukh Terhadap Istimbat Hukum," *Al Qalam: Jurnal Ilmiah Keagamaan Dan Kemasyarakatan* 16, no. 6 (23 Januari 2023): 2521–38, doi:10.35931/aq.v16i6.1840.

<sup>11</sup> Fadillah dan Irham, "Nasakh Pembentukan Elastisitas Hukum Islam."

<sup>12</sup> Muhammad Rafi, "Konsep Nasikh Wa Mansukh Menurut Syah Wali Allah Al-Dahlawi Dan Implementasinya," *Jurnal Ilmiah Mahasiswa Ransban Fikir* 9, no. 2 (4 Agustus 2020): 112–29, doi:10.24090/jimrf.v9i2.4142.

<sup>13</sup> Yusril Ainur Rofiq, "Konsep Konsep Nasikh Mansukh Perspektif Ibnu Abi Hatim Dalam Tafsir Al-Qur'an Al-Adzim Musnadan 'an Rasulillah Wa Al-Shahabat Wa Al-Tabi'in," *Jurnal Semiotika-Q: Kajian Ilmu al-Quran dan Tafsir* 3, no. 2 (31 Desember 2023): 240–55, doi:10.19109/jsq.v3i2.21498.

The second stream highlights a shift toward critical reevaluation and deconstruction of classical *nasakh* doctrine. This critique originates not only from Orientalists such as Richard Bell, Goldziher, and John Burton, but also from modern Muslim thinkers like Abdullah Ahmad an-Naim and Mahmoud Muhammad Taha. Abdelnour<sup>14</sup> and Allahverdiha<sup>15</sup> call for a reassessment of fundamental assumptions surrounding *nasakh* through intertextual and historical methods. Meanwhile, Arman<sup>16</sup>, Nurdin, Abdillah<sup>17</sup>, and Shalahuddin<sup>18</sup> explore internal critiques and propose reformulations of Islamic legal paradigms. Contributions by Jamal al-Banna and Jasser Auda, as analyzed by Khoiri et al<sup>19</sup>, along with semantic reinterpretations by Husaynizadeh and Ahmadinezhad<sup>20</sup>, demonstrate how *nasakh* discourse has evolved into a more nuanced, interdisciplinary field of inquiry.

The third stream situates *nasakh* within a strategic and pedagogical framework of gradual legal development (*al-tadarruj fi al-tashri*). Rather than representing abrupt legal annulment, *nasakh* is viewed as part of a structured transition toward legal maturity. Irfanuddin et al<sup>21</sup> And Muhammad et al<sup>22</sup> Regard *nasakh* as a socio-theological strategy for legislative refinement rather than outright repeal. This interpretation aligns with works by Aidulsyah<sup>23</sup>, Haneef<sup>24</sup>, and Fauzi<sup>25</sup>, who emphasize the significance of legal historicity and contextual *ijtihad* in contemporary Islamic jurisprudence. Within this framework, *tadarruj* serves as a critical lens to harmonize scriptural imperatives with evolving social realities, offering reinterpretive space for verses traditionally deemed *mansukh*.

Despite the extensive scholarship on *nasakh*, the specific phenomenon of abrogation without replacement (*nasakh bilā bada*) remains underexplored. Most existing literature tends to polarize the issue: either accepting such abrogation as a divinely ordained necessity, or rejecting *nasakh* altogether as an outdated legal construct. As a result, verses suspected of *nasakh* without a clear legal substitute—such as Q.S. al-Mujadilah [58]:12, Q.S. al-Baqarah [2]:184, and Q.S. an-Nisa [4]:15—have not been thoroughly examined through a progressive historical lens that accounts for the pedagogical nature of Qur’anic legislation.

While some studies have addressed the principle of *tadarruj*—particularly in relation to the prohibition of intoxicants and fasting laws—these discussions are often descriptive and fail to engage with the legal status of verses deemed *mansukh* without replacement. Moreover, *tadarruj fi al-tasyri* is

<sup>14</sup> Mohammed Gamal Abdelnour, “The Qur’ān and the Bible: Abrogation (Naskh) or Confirmation (Taṣḍīq)?,” *Religions* 14, no. 7 (Juli 2023): 856, doi:10.3390/rel14070856.

<sup>15</sup> Mohmmad Mahdi Allahverdiha, “Critical Analysis of Orientalists’ Views on Abrogation, Based on the View of Allameh Tabātabā’i in Al-Mizan (A Comparative Study of Blasher, Richard Bell, John Burton, Georges Sal, Noldeke, Goldziher, and Allameh Tabātabā’i Views),” *Quran and Religious Enlightenment* 2, no. 2 (20 Februari 2022): 9–22, doi:10.30473/quran.2022.8096.

<sup>16</sup> Arman Arman, “Controversy of Nasakh wal Mansukh Theory According to Scholars: Studies on the Thought of Abdullah Ahmad An-Naim,” *Alif Lam : Journal of Islamic Studies and Humanities* 4, no. 1 (21 Agustus 2023): 63–73, doi:10.51700/aliflam.v4i1.486.

<sup>17</sup> Nurdin dan Abdillah, “Polemik Nasikh-Mansukh John Burton Dalam ‘The Collection of The Quran.’”

<sup>18</sup> Shalahuddin, “Teori Naskh Mahmoud Muhammad Taha Dan Sumbangsinya Bagi Pembaruan Hukum Islam Di Dunia Modern.”

<sup>19</sup> Shohib Khoiri dkk., “Abrogation in the Quran: Perspectives of Jamal Al-Banna and Jasser Auda,” *Ma’alim Al-Qur’ān Wa al-Sunnah* 20, no. 1 (1 Juni 2024): 85–106, doi:10.33102/jmq.v20i1.464.

<sup>20</sup> Sayyid Abd Al-Rasul Husaynizadeh dan Fatemeh Ahmadinezhad, “Semantics of Abrogation in Exegetical Narrations,” *Qru’anic Reserches* 28, no. 108 (22 November 2023): 5–24, doi:10.22081/jqr.2023.65759.3678.

<sup>21</sup> M. Irfanuddin, Abdul Muid N, dan Zakaria Husin Lubis, “Nāsikh Mansūkh Dan Implementasinya Dalam Tafsir Al-Qur’an Ul Majid An-Nūr Karya Muhammad Hasbi Ash-Shiddieqy,” *Bersatu: Jurnal Pendidikan Bbinneka Tunggal Ika* 1, no. 3 (18 Mei 2023): 88–107, doi:10.51903/bersatu.v1i3.319.

<sup>22</sup> Muhammad, Sariyekti, dan Sumarjoko, “Rekatualisasi Nasakh Dalam Perspektif Sosiologis.”

<sup>23</sup> Aidulsyah, “The Paradigm of Al-Quran As The Main Element of Islamic Civilization.”

<sup>24</sup> Sayed Sikandar Haneef, “Debate on Methodology of Renewing Muslim Law: A Search for a Synthetic Approach,” *Global Jurist* 10, no. 1 (26 Januari 2010), doi:10.2202/1934-2640.1343.

<sup>25</sup> Fauzi, “The Principles for Ijtihād in Response to the Contemporary Problems.”

frequently treated as mere historical context rather than as an analytical framework to reassess the validity of *nasakh* claims. This creates a theoretical gap: without a contextual reading of revelation dynamics, assertions of *nasakh bilā badal* risk implying normative voids within Islamic law, which contradicts the divine ideal of legal completeness and continuity.

This study addresses that gap by offering a new interpretive framework for reexamining *nasakh* cases lacking explicit replacement through the lens of *tadarruj fi al-tashri'*. It contends that these verses are not annulled in a definitive legal sense, but rather have completed their formative function and transitioned into more universal legal principles. Thus, the article critically evaluates the methodology of *nasakh bilā badal* and proposes a more integrative epistemological model that synthesizes textual authority with social context and divine legal intention. This approach contributes to Qur'anic legal hermeneutics and offers a constructive model for reinterpreting Islamic law in a way that is faithful to revelation yet responsive to contemporary realities.

The article seeks to address the following core questions: (1) Does *nasakh* in the Qur'an always entail a substitute ruling? (2) What are the characteristics and examples of *nasakh* without replacement? (3) Can these cases be reclassified as part of *al-tadarruj fi al-tashri'*, rather than as final legal annulments? (4) What are the epistemological and conceptual implications of this reinterpretation for Islamic law and Qur'anic exegesis?

The objective of this study is to provide a comprehensive and critical explanation of *nasakh* without replacement in the Qur'an and to reinterpret such verses within the framework of *tadarruj* as a model of gradual legal formulation. The study also aims to strengthen the contextual-historical approach within ulūm al-Qur'ān, offering a more flexible and applicable framework for understanding Islamic law while preserving the authoritative principles of revelation. In doing so, the article seeks to make a meaningful scholarly contribution to contemporary studies in Qur'anic hermeneutics and Islamic legal thought.

This study employs a qualitative-descriptive approach through library research, focusing on conceptual discourses of *nasakh* and *al-tadarruj fi al-tashri'* within the Qur'anic legal framework. Primary sources include classical and contemporary tafsīr, as well as foundational works of 'ulūm al-Qur'ān and *uṣūl al-fiqh*. The case verses were selected using three criteria: (1) their frequent classification as mansūkh without a clear *nāsikh*; (2) their centrality in debates on *nasakh bilā badal*; and (3) the presence of divergent scholarly interpretations. On this basis, verses such as Q.S. al-Baqarah [2]:184, 219, 240; Q.S. al-Nisā' [4]:15, 43; Q.S. al-Mujādilah [58]:12–13; and Q.S. al-Mā'idah [5]:90 were examined in detail.

The analysis followed three steps: (1) thematic content analysis to identify patterns in exegetical classifications;<sup>26</sup> (2) contextual hermeneutical analysis of *asbāb al-nuzūl*, chronology of revelation, and intertextual relationships<sup>27</sup>; and (3) synthesis with theoretical frameworks such as *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*.<sup>28</sup> To ensure reliability, the study applied source triangulation across classical, traditional, and modern scholarly perspectives.<sup>29</sup> Adopting a critical-normative stance, the research interprets many alleged cases of *nasakh bilā badal* as instances of pedagogical legal transition (*tadarruj*), rather than absolute annulment, which would lead to normative gaps.

<sup>26</sup> Virginia Braun dan Victoria Clarke, "Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology," *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3, no. 2 (1 Januari 2006): 77–101, doi:<https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa>.

<sup>27</sup> Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *The Study Quran: A New Translation and Commentary* (New York: HarperOne, 2002).

<sup>28</sup> Jasser Auda, *Maqasidi al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law* (London dan Washington: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2007).

<sup>29</sup> Michael Quinn Patton, *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods*, 4 ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2015).

## Discussion

### *Characteristics of Nasakh in the Qur'an*

The concept of *nasakh* (abrogation) in the Qur'an is a central theme in the study of *'ulūm al-Qur'an* and *uṣūl al-fiqh*, particularly in understanding the dynamics of revelation and the evolution of Islamic law. Etymologically, *nasakh* means “to erase,” “to transfer,” or “to copy”; terminologically, it refers to the annulment of a previous legal ruling by a subsequent ruling, either from the same source (the Qur'an) or a different one (e.g., the Sunnah).<sup>30</sup> Classical scholars broadly define it as “*raf' al-ḥukm al-shar'i bi-dalil shar'i mutarākhi 'anhu*” (the nullification of a legal ruling by a later authoritative source). This mechanism is understood as part of divine legislative wisdom that considers the socio-spiritual readiness of the Muslim community to receive and implement divine law.<sup>31</sup>

A fundamental characteristic of *nasakh* is that it is exclusively rooted in revelation and not derived from independent juristic reasoning (*ijtihād*) or analogy (*qiyās*). Abrogation can only occur when supported by *qaṭ'i* (definitive) evidence, either from the Qur'an or *mutawātir* Sunnah. Moreover, a clear chronological order of revelation is essential to establish the *nāsikh* (abrogating text) and the *mansūkh* (abrogated text); otherwise, claims of abrogation remain speculative.<sup>32</sup> Another defining trait is that abrogation presumes an irreconcilable normative conflict between two legal rulings. In such cases, semantic or rhetorical contradictions are insufficient; the contradiction must preclude simultaneous application of both rulings, thus making *nasakh* distinct from interpretative reconciliation (*jam' wa al-ta'wīl*).<sup>33</sup>

Furthermore, *nasakh* is generally confined to rulings related to practical and operational aspects of Islamic law (*aḥkām 'amaliyyah*), and does not apply to theological beliefs (*'aqidah*), moral values, or universal principles. Verses relating to faith in God, the afterlife, prophetic mission, or moral injunctions such as honesty and justice cannot be subject to abrogation. Nor does *nasakh* apply to narrative or informative verses (e.g., divine promises, warnings, or historical accounts) since these do not carry normative legal obligations.<sup>34</sup> However, a unique dimension arises in the phenomenon of *nasakh bilā badal* (abrogation without replacement), where certain verses are deemed to have been abrogated by some exegetes. Still, no explicit substitute is provided—such as Q.S. al-Mujadilah [58]:12 being repealed by Q.S. al-Mujadilah [58]:13 without prescribing a new legal obligation.

This phenomenon raises interpretive tensions, especially among modern scholars who question whether such verses should be classified under *nasakh* in the technical sense. A growing body of contemporary scholarship interprets these instances as part of *al-Tadarruj fi al-Tashrī'*—a gradualist model of legal development, rather than outright annulment.<sup>35</sup> The *tadarruj* approach suggests that divine legislation was revealed progressively, guiding the community through stages of legal and spiritual maturity. In this view, the removal of a ruling without an immediate substitute may represent an educative pause or a transitional step toward a more suitable legal formulation.

<sup>30</sup> Manna' Khalil Al-Qattan, *Mabāḥith fi 'Ulūm al-Qur'an* (Beirut: Mu'assasah al-Risalah, 2006).

<sup>31</sup> Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

<sup>32</sup> Jalaluddin Al-Suyuti, *Al-Itqān fi 'Ulūm al-Qur'an* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2003).

<sup>33</sup> Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Shari'ah Law: An Introduction* (Kuala Lumpur: Ilmiah Publishers, 2008), 304.

<sup>34</sup> Fatoohi, *Abrogation in the Qur'an and Islamic Law*.

<sup>35</sup> Fadillah dan Irham, “Nasakh Pembentukan Elastisitas Hukum Islam”; Rafi, “Konsep Nasikh Wa Mansukh Menurut Syah Wali Allah Al-Dahlawi Dan Implementasinya”; Risman Bustamam dan Hardivizon Hardivizon, “Implementing The Values Of Raḥmatan Li Al-'Ālamīn Through Maqāṣid-Based Exegesis To Achieve Social Justice,” *Jurnal Ushuluddin* 33, no. 1 (1 Juni 2025): 1–21, doi:10.24014/Jush.v33i1.35703.

This epistemological shift highlights the divergence between textual-legalistic readings, which tend to ossify legal meaning, and contextual-progressive interpretations that view revelation as a strategic, evolving process. The early Muslim community transitioned rapidly from Meccan to Medinan contexts, and thus, *nasakh* cannot be understood apart from the historical and sociopolitical backdrop of revelation. Accordingly, assessing *nasakh* requires more than textual analysis—it demands attention to historical circumstances, legal function, and the broader aims of the Sharia (*maqāṣid al-sharīʿah*).<sup>36</sup>

Moreover, *nasakh* may be viewed as a pedagogical tool used by God to cultivate gradual obedience and spiritual discipline. By temporarily enacting a ruling and subsequently repealing it, believers were tested in their readiness to submit, even to commands intended only as interim. This indicates that *nasakh* embodies not only normative and legal dimensions but also educational and psychological functions. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of *nasakh* must integrate textual, historical, normative, and pedagogical perspectives.

The characteristics of *nasakh* in the Qurʾan reflect a complex and multi-layered legislative methodology that accommodates both the needs and capacities of its audience. Not every legal removal signifies the absence of new rulings; many may instead represent transitional moments in a dynamic legal process. This nuanced understanding is crucial, especially in examining *nasakh bilā badal*, which will be discussed in more depth in the subsequent sections of this article.

### **Cases of Nasakh Without Substitution in the Qurʾan**

In the exegetical history of the Qurʾan, several verses have been classified by scholars as instances of *nasakh* (abrogation) without a clearly identified *nasikh* (substitute legal ruling). This phenomenon raises significant theoretical questions: Are these verses genuinely abrogated in the absolute sense, or are they part of a broader strategy of *al-tadarruj fi al-tashriʿ*—the gradual development of Islamic legislation? To address this, it is essential to examine the most frequently cited cases in classical literature and revisit them through a contextual-historical lens supported by cross-tafsir analysis.<sup>37</sup>

One of the most cited examples is Q.S. al-Mujadilah [58]:12, which obligates believers to give charity (*ṣadaqah*) before holding private conversations with the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH):

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِذَا نَاجَيْتُمُ الرَّسُولَ فَقَدِّمُوا بَيْنَ يَدَيْ نَجْوَاكُمْ صَدَقَاتٍ ۚ ذَٰلِكَ خَيْرٌ لَّكُمْ وَأَطْهَرُ ۚ فَإِنْ لَمْ تَجِدُوا فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ غَفُورٌ رَحِيمٌ

“O you who believe! When you consult the Messenger in private, present something in charity before your consultation. That is better for you and purer. But if you cannot afford it—then indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.”

This command was seemingly repealed by the subsequent verse, Q.S. al-Mujadilah [58]:13:

أَشْفَقْتُمْ أَنْ تُقَدِّمُوا بَيْنَ يَدَيْ نَجْوَاكُمْ صَدَقَاتٍ ۚ فَإِذْ لَمْ تَفْعَلُوا وَتَابَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْكُمْ فَأَقِيمُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَآتُوا الزَّكَاةَ وَأَطِيعُوا اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ ۚ وَاللَّهُ خَبِيرٌ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ

<sup>36</sup> Wael B. Hallaq, *Shariʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

<sup>37</sup> Fatoohi, *Abrogation in the Qurʾan and Islamic Law*; Rahman, *Islam and Modernity*.

*“Do you fear offering charity before your private consultation? If you do not and Allah has forgiven you, then establish prayer, give zakat, and obey Allah and His Messenger...”*

Classical scholars such as al-Suyūṭī and al-Zarqānī categorized this as *nasakh bilā badal* (abrogation without replacement), as no new ruling supplanted the original command.<sup>38</sup> However, contemporary exegetes argue that this change reflects legal flexibility rather than definitive nullification. Manna’ al-Qaṭṭān<sup>39</sup>, for instance, contends that the original obligation was temporary and context-specific, and its removal reflects *rukhsah* (legal concession), not a cancellation of a fundamental legal principle.

A second frequently cited example concerns the legislation on fasting. Q.S. al-Baqarah [2]:183 introduces fasting as a religious obligation, followed by verse 184, which allows for feeding the poor as an alternative for those unable to fast, while stating that fasting is better. However, verse 185 then establishes Ramadan fasting as a universal duty, with exemptions only for those who are sick or traveling. While some classical scholars viewed verse 185 as abrogating the previous concession, modern thinkers such as Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida interpret this shift as part of a gradual legal tightening, not a legal abrogation per se.<sup>40</sup>

Another example involves the legal transformation concerning the punishment for adultery. Initially, Q.S. al-Nisā’ [4]:15 stipulated that women proven guilty of immoral conduct (i.e., adultery) should be confined to their homes until a divine judgment was revealed:

وَاللَّاتِي يَأْتِينَ الْفَاحِشَةَ مِنْ نِسَائِكُمْ فَاسْتَشْهَدُوا عَلَيْهِنَّ أَرْبَعَةً مِنْكُمْ فَإِنْ شَهِدُوا فَأَمْسِكُوهُنَّ فِي الْبُيُوتِ حَتَّى  
يَتَوَفَّاهُنَّ الْمَوْتُ أَوْ يَجْعَلَ اللَّهُ لَهُنَّ سَبِيلًا

*“As for those women who commit immoral acts, call upon four witnesses from among you. If they testify, confine them to their houses until death comes to them or Allah ordains for them another way.”*

This provision was subsequently replaced by Q.S. al-Nūr [24]:2, which prescribes a corporal punishment of one hundred lashes for both male and female adulterers:

الرَّائِيَةُ وَالرَّائِي فَاجْلِدُوا كُلَّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْهُمَا مِائَةَ جَلْدَةٍ

*“The woman and the man guilty of adultery—flog each of them with one hundred stripes...”*

Many scholars regard Q.S. al-Nūr [24]:2 as *nasikh* (abrogating) Q.S. al-Nisā’ [4]:15. Since the latter introduces a new ruling, this case is not classified as *nasakh bilā badal* (abrogation without replacement). However, it is essential to note that the “replacement” here carries a significantly more severe legal consequence, marking a clear transition. This raises an important debate: should this *nasakh* be interpreted as a total annulment of the earlier ruling, or is it better understood as part of *al-tadarruj fi al-tashrī*—a gradual progression toward the implementation of *ḥudūd* punishments, representing a firm establishment of moral and social norms?<sup>41</sup>

<sup>38</sup> Al-Suyuti, *Al-Itqān fi ‘Ulūm al-Qur’ān*; Muhammad ‘Abd al-‘Adzīm Al-Zarqānī, *Manāhil al-Ṭarfān fi ‘Ulūm al-Qur’ān* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2001).

<sup>39</sup> Al-Qattan, *Mabāḥith fi ‘Ulūm al-Qur’ān*.

<sup>40</sup> Muḥammad ‘Abduh dan Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār* (Beirut: Dar Al-Je’il, 1367).

<sup>41</sup> Kamali, *Shari’ah Law*.

These three examples—charity before *najwā*, the concession in fasting, and the shift in *ḥadd* punishment for adultery—illustrate the variability in the legal effects of *nasakh*. In some cases, the prior ruling is left without a substitute; in others, the change introduces a stricter obligation. This raises interpretive ambiguity: should such legal shifts be viewed as absolute abrogation or as a pedagogical transition reflective of *al-tadarruj fi al-tashri*?

Contemporary interpretations increasingly adopt a contextual-historical perspective, framing such legal changes as part of a strategic, phased process of moral and legal formation. The prohibition of intoxicants is often cited as a model: from acknowledgment of benefit and harm (Q.S. al-Baqarah [2]:219), to the prohibition of prayer while intoxicated (Q.S. an-Nisa [4]:43), culminating in total prohibition (Q.S. al-Mā'idah [5]:90). Rather than being classified strictly under *nasakh*, this sequence exemplifies gradual prohibition aligned with *tadarruj* principles.<sup>42</sup>

Modern scholars such as Muhammad Tahir al-Misawi and Fazlur Rahman emphasize that apparent cases of *nasakh* without replacement should be viewed through pedagogical and sociological lenses. Laws deemed repealed may have served their formative function in shaping social awareness, thus rendering their continuation unnecessary. The disappearance of a law in such cases reflects legal maturity rather than a normative vacuum.

Thus, closer examination of such cases reveals that assumptions about *nasakh bilā badal* often stem from overly literal readings of the text, neglecting revelatory context, social transformation, and the higher objectives of Islamic law. By integrating *maqāṣid al-shari'ah* and *tadarruj fi al-tashri*, one may develop a more comprehensive and adaptive understanding of legal change in the Qur'an—one that balances fidelity to revelation with contextual insight.

### ***Nasakh or Tadarruj? A Hermeneutical Analysis of Legal Change in the Qur'an***

A fundamental question that arises from the analysis of legal transitions in the Qur'an is whether such changes should be classified as *nasakh* (abrogation) in the technical sense established by classical *uṣūl al-fiqh* scholars, or more appropriately understood as part of *al-Tadarruj fi al-Tashri*—a gradual process of legal formation. Addressing this issue requires a hermeneutical approach that examines not only the textual and linguistic features of the verses but also considers the socio-historical context of revelation, the structural realities of early Muslim society, and the normative intentions behind the legal verses.

Conceptually, while *nasakh* and *tadarruj* share overlapping features, they differ methodologically. *Nasakh* involves two legally normative texts that are mutually exclusive in application and necessitate a clear chronological order in revelation, thereby establishing the exclusivity of the later ruling.<sup>43</sup> In contrast, *tadarruj* represents a pedagogical and strategic unfolding of divine law, enabling the community to progressively internalize and implement legal norms within a psychological and social context.<sup>44</sup> Thus, *nasakh* reflects a legal finality, whereas *tadarruj* reflects an educational transition toward legal maturity.

For example, in the case of *najwā* (private consultation), Q.S. al-Mujadilah [58]:12 requires charity before engaging in private conversation with the Prophet. This obligation was later removed in Q.S. al-Mujadilah [58]:13. From a contextual perspective, the abrogation was not a normative vacuum but a response to practical difficulties in implementation. The absence of a substitute ruling signals a return to general principles such as *rukhsah* (concession), seen in rulings on shortened prayers

<sup>42</sup> Farid Esack, *The Qur'an: A Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2002); Rahman, *Islam and Modernity*.

<sup>43</sup> Al-Suyuti, *Al-Itqān fi 'Ulūm al-Qur'an*; Kamali, *Shari'ah Law*.

<sup>44</sup> Rahman, *Islam and Modernity*.



or fasting exemptions. Hence, the change constitutes a normative recalibration rather than a complete legal negation.<sup>45</sup>

In Q.S. al-Baqarah [2]:183–185, a similar argument applies. The transition from a concessionary approach that allows *fidyah* (feeding people experiencing poverty) to the general obligation of fasting in Ramadan is not a contradiction, but a progression. As al-Rāzī and other exegetes note, the Qur’anic phrase “*wa an taṣūmū khayrun lakum*” (and fasting is better for you) underscores the pedagogical intent of preparing the community for the whole legal obligation. The presence of this transitional phrase suggests not abrogation, but gradual legal refinement.<sup>46</sup>

The case of adultery laws further illustrates the dynamics of *tadarruj*. Q.S. an-Nisa [4]:15 prescribes house confinement for convicted women, whereas Q.S. an-Nur [24]:2 prescribes corporal punishment. A historical reading shows that the earlier verse was revealed in the early Madinan period, a time of social instability, and aimed at preventive containment. The later verse introduced *ḥudūd* (fixed punishments) only after a stable legal and political environment was established.<sup>47</sup> Therefore, the change reflects institutional maturity rather than legal contradiction.

Contemporary hermeneutics supports the notion of legal change as dynamic and adaptive. Fazlur Rahman’s “double movement theory” suggests that Qur’anic verses must be understood in their socio-historical context before extracting their universal principles for application in modern settings.<sup>48</sup> This framework is particularly relevant when addressing verses traditionally classified as *nasakh*, which, upon deeper analysis, often reflect ongoing moral and legal construction rather than abrupt cancellation.

This reading has profound implications—a rigid understanding of *nasakh* risks portraying Islamic law as inconsistent or arbitrarily mutable. Conversely, viewing legal change through the lens of *tadarruj* reveals a Qur’anic legal system that is pedagogically driven, contextually sensitive, and normatively stable. Such a model aligns closely with the objectives of *maqāṣid al-shari’ah*, which prioritize the preservation of life, intellect, dignity, religion, and property.<sup>49</sup>

Moreover, *tadarruj* opens pathways for contemporary *ijtihād* on legal verses that are no longer practicable in literal form. Verses such as those concerning *najwā* or the confinement of adulterous women can be reinterpreted as socio-educational measures rather than permanent legal injunctions. In this sense, *nasakh* may not signify annulment, but rather transformation—toward more mature and socially responsive legal forms.<sup>50</sup>

Thus, a hermeneutical analysis of legal change in the Qur’an indicates that many cases traditionally labeled as *nasakh bilā badal* are better understood as stages within the concept of *tadarruj*. Qur’anic legal transformation is not normative discontinuity but pedagogical continuity—shaped by context, necessity, and communal readiness. This approach not only remains faithful to the spirit of divine law but also provides a more adaptable model for navigating legal development in the modern era.

### ***Epistemological and Normative Implications***

Understanding the concept of *nasakh* (abrogation) in the Qur’an carries not only normative legal consequences but also significant epistemological implications for Islamic thought. Specifically,

<sup>45</sup> Al-Qattan, *Mabahith fi ‘Ulūm al-Qur’an*.

<sup>46</sup> Muhammad Fakhr al-Din al-Rāzī, *Tafsir al-Kabir wa Mafatih al-Ghaib* (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turats al-‘Arab, 1420).

<sup>47</sup> Hallaq, *Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations*.

<sup>48</sup> Rahman, *Islam and Modernity*.

<sup>49</sup> Kamali, *Shari’ah Law*; Auda, *Maqasidi al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law*.

<sup>50</sup> Fatoohi, *Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law*.

it impacts how Muslims perceive the dynamics of revelation and the validity of *sharʿi* rulings. If *nasakh* is rigidly interpreted as the complete abrogation of a legal ruling without an explicit substitute, this may raise epistemic concerns about the coherence and purposefulness of divine legislation. It may suggest that the Qurʾan intentionally includes laws that are later nullified without clear direction. In this regard, the concept of *al-Tadarruj fi al-Tashri* (gradual legislation) offers a more integrative and constructive interpretive framework for approaching legal change in revelation.<sup>51</sup>

From an epistemological standpoint, the *tadarruj* approach affirms that revelation is dynamic, evolving in response to the social and historical conditions of its recipients. Revelation is not merely a static body of finalized texts but a pedagogical process of moral and legal formation. Thus, verses that appear to abrogate previous rulings without direct replacements can be understood as pedagogical transitions, where the earlier law has fulfilled its function and no longer requires reinforcement in literal form.<sup>52</sup> This approach contrasts with the classical rigid understanding of *nasakh*, which treats legal change as abrupt and final.

Normatively, this understanding has substantial implications for contemporary Islamic legal theory. A rigid view of *nasakh* as legal cancellation without substitute could create perceived gaps in the legal system, which contradicts the Islamic legal principle of avoiding legal voids and ensuring normative continuity for the sake of public welfare (*maṣlaḥah*).<sup>53</sup> Framing legal changes as part of a *tadarruj* process instead allows earlier, context-specific verses to be linked with enduring universal principles. In such cases, the abrogated ruling is not erased but transformed—its purpose is achieved, and its reiteration is unnecessary.

In Qurʾanic interpretation, these implications reinforce the significance of maqāṣid-oriented and thematic exegesis. Thematic interpretation (*tafsir mawḍūʿī*) becomes more robust when guided by the understanding that revelation unfolds progressively and contextually. Similarly, *maqāṣid al-sharʿiah*-based interpretation allows seemingly abrogated verses to be reframed within broader value frameworks—such as justice, compassion, and moral development—rather than being viewed as obsolete rules.<sup>54</sup>

Moreover, this approach repositions *ḥadīth* and *ijtihād* within Islamic jurisprudence. If not all legal changes in the Qurʾan result from *nasakh*, then *ḥadīth* and *ijtihād* play a vital role in interpreting transitions and deriving new rulings in line with ethical objectives. In classical uṣūl al-fiqh, *nasakh* was often used to reject certain *ḥadīth* or restrict juristic reasoning. In contrast, the *tadarruj* framework expands the space for *ijtihād*, encouraging jurists to extract the ethical essence behind shifting rulings and adapt them to modern societal needs.<sup>55</sup>

This also upholds the consistency and integrity of the Qurʾan. If legal changes are interpreted without regard to context and legislative intent, it may lead to perceptions of internal contradictions within the Qurʾanic text. Such a view could undermine the credibility of divine revelation. Conversely, a *tadarruj*-based approach demonstrates the systematic coherence between Qurʾanic text and context, presenting revelation as a deliberate and staged guide for building a morally upright and legally sound society.<sup>56</sup>

From a pedagogical and civilizational perspective, the gradual nature of legal revelation reflects a strategy of nurturing and empowerment. Like the gradual prohibition of alcohol, many Qurʾanic

<sup>51</sup> Rahman, *Islam and Modernity*; Auda, *Maqasidi al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law*.

<sup>52</sup> Fatoohi, *Abrogation in the Qurʾan and Islamic Law*; Hallaq, *Shariʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations*.

<sup>53</sup> Kamali, *Shariʿah Law*.

<sup>54</sup> Auda, *Maqasidi al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law*.

<sup>55</sup> Kamali, *Shariʿah Law*; Auda, *Maqasidi al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law*.

<sup>56</sup> Esack, *The Qurʾan*.

laws were revealed in stages, aligned with the psychological and societal readiness of the early Muslim community. The cessation of specific legal obligations, then, does not denote annulment in the negative sense, but completion of a divine pedagogical mission. This reinforces the view of *shari'ah* as a source of *rahmah* (mercy), not a legal burden.

Finally, this approach has significant implications for contemporary Islamic legislation. In pluralistic and modern societies, legal reasoning must go beyond literal textualism to include the objectives (*maqāṣid*), social contexts, and the historical dynamics of Qur'anic law. A narrow understanding of *nasakh* may stifle creativity and hinder the reform of Islamic thought. By contrast, viewing legal change through the lens of *tadarruj* provides an epistemological and normative foundation for reformulating Islamic law in a manner that is both faithful to revelation and responsive to contemporary realities.

In conclusion, the approach to *nasakh* should transcend the binary of “abrogated vs. abrogating” and embrace a broader understanding of the Qur'an as a guide for gradual civilizational transformation. The epistemological and normative implications of *al-Tadarruj fi al-Tashri'* affirm that the Qur'an is not merely a legal code but a moral and educational discourse designed to guide societies progressively toward justice, balance, and well-being.

### ***Theoretical Synthesis and Reflection***

From the preceding discussion, it becomes clear that the concept of *nasakh* (abrogation) in the Qur'an—particularly in cases where no replacement ruling is provided—constitutes a complex and multilayered discourse with far-reaching methodological implications. Classical *uṣūl al-fiqh* approaches, which often adopt a literal-legalistic reading of *nasakh*, tend to treat legal change as a total abrogation of the prior text. While such a model has systematic coherence, it frequently overlooks the historical dynamics of revelation, the socio-cultural structure of the early Muslim community, and the divine intent behind progressive lawmaking. As such, there is a pressing need for an alternative approach—namely, *al-Tadarruj fi al-Tashri'* (gradual legislation)—that offers a more contextual and forward-looking interpretation.<sup>57</sup>

This study demonstrates that many verses traditionally classified as *mansūkh bilā badal* (abrogated without replacement) do not meet the formal criteria of *nasakh*, such as definitive normative conflict or an explicit subsequent ruling. Instead, these verses are more accurately read as components of a pedagogical, educational, and phased legal transition. This is evident in the cases of *ṣadaqah* before private consultation (Q.S. al-Mujādilah 58:12–13), the fasting regulations in Q.S. al-Baqarah 2:183–185, and the transformation of adultery punishment in Q.S. al-Nisā' 4:15 and al-Nūr 24:2. These examples affirm that the Qur'an does not deliver legal rulings in a single, final stage but progressively builds a morally and socially ready legal framework.<sup>58</sup>

From the perspective of Islamic legal theory, *tadarruj* presents a powerful theoretical paradigm. It harmonizes the principles of legal facilitation (*taysir*), progressive application (*tadarruj*), and the higher objectives of Islamic law (*maqāṣid al-shari'ah*). With this framework, Islamic law is no longer perceived as a rigid dogmatic system but as a living, value-based legal order that evolves in response to changing circumstances. This also opens the door to reinterpreting Qur'anic legal texts in a way that balances fidelity to revelation with contemporary relevance.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>57</sup> Haneef, “Debate on Methodology of Renewing Muslim Law.”

<sup>58</sup> Husaynizadeh dan Ahmadinezhad, “Semantics of Abrogation in Exegetical Narrations.”

<sup>59</sup> Andi Rahman, “Mempertanyakan Konsep Al-Naskh Dalam Alquran,” *Jurnal Studi Al-Qur'an* 5, no. 1 (1 Januari 2009): 53–61, <https://journal.unj.ac.id/unj/index.php/jsq/article/view/4738>.

Reflectively, a rigid understanding of *nasakh*—especially in cases without replacement—rooted in classical legal formalism risks intellectual stagnation and internal contradiction. Accepting the idea that Allah abrogates a law without offering any substitute may imply a normative vacuum in Islamic law, which contradicts the principles of *shumūliyyah* (comprehensiveness) and *istimrāriyyah* (continuity). The *tadarruj* paradigm provides a conceptual bridge that upholds the authority of revelation while integrating rationality and sociocultural realities into legal reasoning.<sup>60</sup>

This theoretical reflection further underscores the urgency of reforming Qur’anic exegesis, particularly in legal interpretation (*tafsīr al-aḥkām*). Modern scholars such as Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, and Ibn ‘Ashur have laid the groundwork for a rational-contextual methodology in interpreting legal verses.<sup>61</sup> Yet, the widespread application of these ideas in academic and legislative practice remains limited, hindered by the dominance of traditionalist textualism. Embracing the *tadarruj* framework enables scholars and legislators to develop flexible and functional legal policies that remain faithful to the core objectives of *shari’ah*.

In socio-religious contexts, a progressive reading of legal transformation in the Qur’an—aligned with *tadarruj*—also offers a mediating discourse between traditionalist and reformist camps. Traditionalists can remain grounded in classical heritage, while reformists gain normative support for contextual reinterpretation. In this way, *tadarruj* functions not only as a revelatory strategy but also as an epistemological tool for negotiating continuity and change in Islamic law.

Moreover, the discourse on *nasakh bilā badal* is not merely a technical issue but a critical reflection on the very heart of Islamic legal philosophy: how law is revealed, operationalized, and developed. This necessitates a multi-level interpretive approach—textual, contextual, and functional—capable of sustaining a dynamic and responsive legal hermeneutics. Understanding *nasakh* as pedagogical rather than strictly eliminative preserves the vitality of Islamic law in engaging with evolving historical challenges.<sup>62</sup>

Ultimately, approaching *nasakh* through the paradigm of *al-Tadarruj fī al-Tashrī‘* offers a renewed epistemological synthesis in Islamic legal theory. It not only reinterprets verses often thought to be abrogated without a strong normative basis, but also affirms that legal transformation in the Qur’an is strategic, educational, and phased. The Qur’anic legal framework was never intended to confuse the community, but rather to guide it systematically toward moral and spiritual maturity. Therefore, *tadarruj* is not merely a technical principle in legal theory but a normative and epistemological paradigm that underpins the enduring relevance of Islamic law throughout history.

## Conclusion

This study revisits the concept of *nasakh* (abrogation) in the Qur’an, particularly the phenomenon of *nasakh* without replacement, which has traditionally been interpreted literally as the

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<sup>60</sup> Fatoohi, *Abrogation in the Qur’an and Islamic Law*; Auda, *Maqasidi al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law*; Ali Dhaigham Taher, “The Relationship of Abrogation between the Qur’an and the Sunnah,” (*Humanities, Social and Applied Sciences*) *Misan Journal of Academic Studies* 24, no. 54 (6 Juli 2025): 57–72, <http://www.misan-jas.com/index.php/ojs/article/view/940>; Basri Mahmud dkk., “Facing the Challenges of Islamophobia: A Study on the Message of Peace in the Qur’an Through the Ma’na Cum Maghza Approach,” *TAJIDID: Jurnal Ilmu Ushuluddin* 24, no. 1 (30 Juni 2025): 279–317, doi:10.30631/tjd.v24i1.551.

<sup>61</sup> ‘Abduh dan Ridā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*; Muhammad al-Tahir Ibn ‘Asyur, *Tafsīr al-Tahrir wa al-Tamwir* (Tunisia: al-Dar al-Tunisiah li al-Nasyr, 1984).

<sup>62</sup> Rahman, *Islam and Modernity*; Hallaq, *Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations*; Ahmad Izzuddin Khotami dan Masruhan, “Polemik Nasikh Mansukh Dalam QS. al-Nahl: 101: Relevansi Dan Kontekstualisasinya,” *JADID: Journal of Quranic Studies and Islamic Communication* 4, no. 02 (18 November 2024): 55–66, doi:10.33754/jadid.v4i02.903.

nullification of a legal ruling without a subsequent substitute. Through textual, contextual, and hermeneutical analysis of several key verses frequently cited under this category, the findings suggest that most legal transitions in the Qur'an do not fully align with the classical *criteria for nasakh in uṣūl al-fiqh*. Instead, many of these shifts are more accurately understood within the framework of *al-Tadarruj fi al-Tashri*—the gradual development and refinement of Islamic legal norms.

Analysis of verses such as Q.S. al-Mujādilah [58]:12–13, Q.S. al-Baqarah [2]:183–185, and Q.S. al-Nisā' [4]:15 in relation to Q.S. al-Nūr [24]:2 reveals clear pedagogical and social patterns underlying these changes. These transitions reflect a revelatory strategy aimed at cultivating moral, spiritual, and social preparedness within the Muslim community. The rulings in question were not unconditionally annulled, but instead transformed more stable norms aligned with the higher objectives of Islamic law (*maqāṣid al-shari'ah*).

The *tadarruj* approach provides a more integrative and contextual framework for understanding the dynamics of Islamic legal evolution. It not only bridges the gap between text and lived reality but also reinforces the Qur'an's character as a pedagogical, morally instructive, and historically responsive scripture. Epistemologically, this approach affirms that revelation is a living, gradual process aimed at cultivating a mature civilization, rather than a static compilation of final legal commands.

Accordingly, the concept of *nasakh* without replacement should be reconstructed—not as a legal void or normative abolition, but as part of a broader strategy of transformative legislation in revelation. This article thus advocates for a renewed methodology of Qur'anic legal interpretation that embraces contextual, historical, and maqāṣid-driven readings. Strengthening *al-Tadarruj fi al-Tashri* as a paradigm of both tafsir and legal reasoning offers a promising path toward sustaining the relevance of Islamic law in addressing the complexities of the modern world—flexibly, yet faithfully rooted in divine revelation.

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