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# Enacting Entrepreneurial Leadership under Constraint: A Single-Case Study of the DRIV-EL Framework in an Emerging Indonesian Private University

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**Abstract**: Entrepreneurial leadership constructs were developed largely in commercial settings, and little is known about how they are enacted where academic authority is distributed and resources are thin. This single-case study examines how the four dimensions of DRIV-EL, a synthesis framework comprising Dynamism, Resilience, Innovation, and Vision, are enacted in an emerging Indonesian private university, and which institutional conditions shape that enactment. Unlike survey-based studies of leadership in Indonesian higher education, it compares accounts from seven positions, from the foundation chair to students and an alumnus (24 informants), using framework analysis with DRIV-EL as a sensitizing lens. Dynamism was tempered by institutional caution, and leaders' risk-taking was thinly evidenced. Resilience appeared mainly as continuity work by administrative staff and programme heads under chronic resource constraints. Innovation tended to remain at programme level rather than becoming institutional routine. Vision was not yet fully aligned across levels: the foundation chair described formal innovation autonomy with incentives, whereas programme heads and the dean reported that no formal policy was yet in place at programme level. Theoretically, the study proposes four refinements to DRIV-EL for testing, each linked to an explanatory mechanism rooted in split decision rights, chronic constraint, and immature routines, and identifies resource mobilisation as a boundary condition that the framework omits. Practically, it points foundations and academic leaders to innovation policy that is written and shared across levels, an explicit route for institutionalising innovations, recognition of continuity work, and clarity about the foundation's decision rights.

**Keywords:** Entrepreneurial Leadership; DRIV-EL; Academic Leadership; Emerging Private University; Sensitizing Concept; Qualitative Case Study.

## INTRODUCTION

Higher education institutions (HEIs) are increasingly expected to show that their graduates are employable, adaptive, and capable of creating value under uncertainty (Aver et al., 2021; Zaleniene & Pereira, 2021), and to cultivate creativity, critical thinking, problem-solving, and innovation among students (Ghafar, 2020; Raitskaya & Tikhonova, 2019). Meeting these expectations places

demands on how universities are led. Evidence from Indonesian private higher education indicates that leadership is associated with institutional capability and performance (Yang et al., 2023). What this evidence does not show is how leaders in such institutions act entrepreneurially: how they recognise opportunities, commit resources, and introduce change in organizations where they cannot simply direct others.

This last condition is a defining feature of universities. Academic organizations have long been described as loosely coupled systems in which units retain considerable autonomy and change initiated at one level is not automatically transmitted to others (Weick, 1976), and as self-regulating systems held together by formal and informal rules, in which collegial, bureaucratic, political, and anarchical patterns of organization coexist (Birnbaum, 1988). Leadership in universities is commonly described as distributed, both devolved through formal structures and emerging among colleagues (Bolden et al., 2009), and effective departmental leadership has been associated with consulting colleagues, credibility as a role model, and a collegial working atmosphere (Bryman, 2007). Entrepreneurial leadership, by contrast, was conceptualised largely in settings where a leader can more readily mobilise others toward a chosen opportunity (Gupta et al., 2004; Kuratko, 2007; Renko et al., 2015). Whether, and in what form, the conduct described by entrepreneurial leadership constructs appears under distributed academic authority is therefore an open empirical question rather than a matter of applying an existing instrument.

Existing research leaves two limitations. First, dominant constructs and measurement instruments have largely been developed and validated in commercial or general organizational settings, and their applicability to universities cannot be assumed. Second, research on entrepreneurship in Indonesian higher education has concentrated on students and edupreneurship outcomes rather than on the leadership conduct through which such outcomes are pursued (see below). Much of the available evidence on leadership in Indonesian higher education is survey-based (e.g., Yang et al., 2023). Surveys can estimate how strongly rated leadership attributes are associated with outcomes, but they cannot show how a dimension is translated into specific decisions, nor whether its meaning differs between those who exercise leadership and those who experience it. Because enactment is relational and positional, addressing this gap requires accounts from several organizational positions, including staff, students, and graduates, not only from leaders. This is the rationale for the interview-based, multi-position design adopted here.

The setting matters theoretically. In Indonesia, private higher education institutions are established and governed through a foundation or other organizing body (*badan penyelenggara*), which holds authority over strategic and

financial decisions alongside the academic leadership (Law No. 12 of 2012). Emerging private universities, defined here as institutions that have recently expanded their programme portfolio and have not yet stabilised their structures, accreditation status, and resource base, intensify three conditions that entrepreneurial leadership theory tends to take for granted. They have little organizational slack with which to absorb failed experiments; authority to commit resources is split between the foundation and the academic hierarchy; and the routines that could carry an innovation beyond its initiator are still being built. These conditions make an emerging private university a setting in which the assumptions behind entrepreneurial leadership constructs are likely to be stretched, and therefore a useful instrumental case (Stake, 1995).

The present study examines the enactment of DRIV-EL, a four-dimensional framework comprising Dynamism, Resilience, Innovation, and Vision, which the authors synthesised from the entrepreneurial leadership literature at the outset of the doctoral project of which this study is part (see The DRIV-EL Framework below). The framework is used here as a sensitizing lens (Blumer, 1954; Bowen, 2006) rather than as a measurement instrument or a hypothesis to be confirmed. The doctoral project also included a survey strand analysed with structural equation modelling; that strand is not reported or drawn on here, and the present paper does not seek to corroborate it. The study addresses two research questions:

(1) How are the four DRIV-EL dimensions (Dynamism, Resilience, Innovation, and Vision) enacted by academic leaders in an emerging Indonesian private university?

(2) How do participants describe the institutional conditions that shape the enactment of the four DRIV-EL dimensions?

Each of the two limitations identified above is matched by an element of the study's framing and by a corresponding contribution. The first gap, that entrepreneurial leadership constructs were developed in commercial settings, is addressed by reading DRIV-EL against the governance literature on loose coupling and distributed leadership (Bolden et al., 2009; Weick, 1976); the corresponding contribution is a specification of what each dimension involves under distributed authority and resource constraint, offered as refinements to DRIV-EL for testing, together with the mechanisms that may explain them. The second gap, that evidence is largely survey-based and centred on leaders, is addressed by the multi-position design; the corresponding contribution is evidence on where enactment diverges between organizational levels and on who carries it, including the continuity work done below the leadership tier. Because DRIV-EL is used as a sensitizing lens rather than as a hypothesis, the

contribution lies in how the dimensions were specified and in what the lens did not anticipate, not in confirming that the four dimensions are present.

**Entrepreneurial Leadership as a Conceptual Construct**

Entrepreneurial leadership provides a potentially useful perspective for understanding leadership under conditions of uncertainty and resource constraint. Gupta et al. (2004) conceptualised entrepreneurial leadership as mobilising others toward value creation under conditions of uncertainty, whereas Renko et al. (2015) characterised it as involving opportunity recognition and the influence of others toward pursuing identified opportunities. Kuratko (2007) argued that entrepreneurial leadership is necessary for firms of all sizes, not only for new ventures. Subsequent research has elaborated the construct dimensionally and examined its measurement (Bagheri & Harrison, 2020), and Leitch & Volery (2017) have traced its development as a field of inquiry. Across these formulations, entrepreneurial leadership is consistently associated with opportunity recognition, mobilisation of organizational actors, tolerance of calculated risk, resource mobilisation, and value creation under uncertainty. A recurring limitation is that these constructs were developed principally in commercial settings, whereas in universities authority is distributed, professional autonomy constrains directive action, and legitimacy is negotiated among peers rather than conferred hierarchically.

Because the Vision dimension in particular overlaps with transformational leadership, it is necessary to state what makes the conduct examined here entrepreneurial. Renko et al. (2015) define entrepreneurial leadership as influencing and directing group members toward organizational goals that involve recognising and exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities. Its object is therefore a specific opportunity, whereas transformational leadership, in Bass & Avolio's (1994) formulation, raises followers' motivation and commitment through idealised influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualised consideration. Strategic leadership, in turn, concerns the organization as a whole: Ireland & Hitt (1999) describe it as determining the organization's purpose or vision, exploiting and maintaining core competences, developing human capital, sustaining an effective culture, emphasising ethical practices, and establishing balanced organizational controls. Table 2 summarises these distinctions and the interpretive criterion they imply for this study: conduct was interpreted as entrepreneurial only where participants linked it to a specific opportunity, a new practice, or value creation under uncertainty. Statements about inspiration or direction-setting without such a link were retained as context but not counted as evidence for an entrepreneurial dimension.

## The Entrepreneurial University and Edupreneurship in Indonesia

The entrepreneurial university tradition has examined institutional transformation through entrepreneurship, innovation, third-mission activities, and university-industry interaction (Clark, 1998; Etzkowitz, 2004; Guerrero & Urbano, 2012), situating entrepreneurial activity at the level of institutional reconfiguration rather than individual leadership conduct. Within Indonesian higher education, entrepreneurship research has more commonly focused on student development and edupreneurship, that is, the cultivation of entrepreneurial knowledge, skills, attitudes, and value creation through educational activities (Abbas et al., 2022; Darwish, 2019; Gedeon, 2017; Lackeus, 2015; Nurjaya et al., 2020; Peschl et al., 2021), and on how entrepreneurship education shapes students' entrepreneurial cognition, intention, and employability (Chen et al., 2022; Mittal & Raghuvaran, 2021; Raza et al., 2021). Collectively, this body of work documents entrepreneurial outcomes among students and institutions but says comparatively little about the leadership conduct through which such outcomes are pursued.

## The DRIV-EL Framework

DRIV-EL is not an established instrument from the literature. It is a synthesis developed by the authors as the conceptual basis of the doctoral project of which this study is part. The synthesis started from recurring elements in definitions and reviews of entrepreneurial leadership (Bagheri & Harrison, 2020; Gupta et al., 2004; Hoang et al., 2025; Leitch & Volery, 2017; Renko et al., 2015). Four dimensions were retained because each names a distinct leadership function relevant to organizations that face change with limited resources: acting on opportunities (Dynamism), sustaining effort under adversity (Resilience), generating new practices (Innovation), and providing future direction (Vision).

Three elements that are prominent in the literature were not given separate dimensions. Opportunity recognition and risk-taking were folded into Dynamism, on the reasoning that in a university the leadership question is less whether an opportunity is noticed than whether it is acted on; one consequence is that risk-taking is not independently represented, a point revisited in the Discussion. Resource mobilisation, which Kuratko (2007) includes among the essential ingredients of entrepreneurship, was not included as a dimension; the findings suggest that this omission matters in a resource-constrained setting. The four dimensions are therefore an analytical selection, not an exhaustive account of entrepreneurial leadership. Table 1 presents the grounding, description, and function of each dimension.

Table 1. The Four Dimensions of Entrepreneurial Leadership in the DRIV-EL Framework

| Dimension | Theoretical Grounding | Description | Function in Entrepreneurial Leadership |
|---|---|---|---|
| D - Dynamism | Gupta et al. (2004); Renko et al. (2015); Leitch & Volery (2017) | The proactive, flexible, and adaptive disposition of leaders in recognising and acting on opportunities as conditions change. | Keeps the organization responsive to external change and able to convert opportunities into action. |
| R - Resilience | Gupta et al. (2004), absorbing uncertainty; Hoang et al. (2025) | Leaders' persistence and capacity to recover from setbacks while maintaining team stability. | Maintains organizational stability and morale under pressure, crisis, and uncertainty. |
| I - Innovation | Renko et al. (2015); Zainol et al. (2018); Malibari & Bajaba (2022); Bagheri & Harrison (2020) | Encouraging creativity, experimentation, and new solutions that add value to the organization. | Stimulates idea development, technology adoption, and creative cross-functional approaches. |
| V - Vision | Gupta et al. (2004), envisioning possible outcomes; Bagheri & Harrison (2020); Hoang et al. (2025); Bass & Avolio (1994)* | Formulating and communicating a forward-looking direction anchored in the opportunities the organization pursues. | Provides strategic direction for pursuing shared goals and long-term development. |

*Note. Compiled by the authors. *Bass & Avolio (1994) is a transformational-leadership source; Table 2 sets out how Vision is distinguished from transformational and strategic leadership in this study.*

Table 2. Entrepreneurial, Transformational, and Strategic Leadership Compared

| Aspect | Entrepreneurial leadership | Transformational leadership | Strategic leadership |
|---|---|---|---|
| Core object of influence | Group members' pursuit of goals that involve recognising and exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities | Followers' motivation and commitment | The organization as a whole and its competitiveness |
| Characteristic | Absorbing uncertainty | Idealised influence, | Determining purpose |

| Aspect | Entrepreneurial leadership | Transformational leadership | Strategic leadership |
|---|---|---|---|
| conduct | and envisioning possible outcomes for others; pursuing opportunities | inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, individualised consideration | or vision, exploiting core competences, developing human capital, sustaining culture, ethical practices, balanced controls |
| Key sources | Gupta et al. (2004); Renko et al. (2015); Kuratko (2007) | Bass & Avolio (1994) | Ireland & Hitt (1999) |
| Criterion used in this study | Counted when conduct is linked to a specific opportunity, new practice, or value creation under uncertainty | Inspiration without such a link: retained as context only | Direction-setting without such a link: retained as context only |

*Note. Compiled by the authors from the sources listed.*

In this study the framework functions as a sensitizing lens: it indicated where to look, but the dimensions were not presented to participants, and the field categories were developed from participants' own accounts before being charted against the dimensions. One consequence of this design is that the presence of the four dimensions in the data cannot count as evidence for the framework, since the lens shaped what was looked for. The analytically informative results are therefore of two kinds: how each dimension's meaning was specified in this setting, and what the lens did not anticipate or where the evidence for a dimension was thin.

## RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

### Research Design

This study employed a qualitative instrumental case study design (Stake, 1995). An instrumental design was appropriate because the interest lay not in the institution as an end in itself, but in what it could reveal about entrepreneurial leadership enactment under conditions of distributed authority and resource constraint. The case was bounded by a single emerging private university in Indonesia (hereafter 'the University'; its name is withheld to protect participants in single-occupant roles, see Ethical procedures). By 'emerging', the study refers to an institution that has recently expanded its programme offerings, is undergoing active quality improvement, accreditation development,

and digital transformation, and has not yet fully stabilised its organizational structures and resource base.

At the time of the study, the University had more than a dozen undergraduate study programmes across several faculties, over a hundred lecturers, and several thousand active students, most programmes having been opened during an expansion phase that began in 2020. It is governed by a foundation (*yayasan*) whose chair holds authority over strategic and financial decisions, with academic leadership exercised by the rector, deans, and study programme heads.

Data collection took place between April 2025 and June 2026. The doctoral institution's letter of request was issued on 22 April 2025, the host university approved the study on 28 April 2025 with effect from April 2025, and on 20 June 2026 the host university certified that fieldwork had been completed for the period April 2025 to 20 June 2026. Individual interview dates and durations were not recorded in the study record, so it cannot be shown which interviews took place before or after 2 September 2025, when Minister of Higher Education, Science, and Technology Regulation No. 39 of 2025 replaced Regulation No. 53 of 2023 on quality assurance. The interviews were not designed to examine regulation, and no informant mentioned the regulatory change; it is therefore treated as background rather than as an explanatory condition.

**Reflexivity and Researcher Positionality**

The second author is a member of the academic staff at the University; the first author is externally affiliated and holds no position there. All 24 interviews were conducted by the second author (see Table 3), so participants were speaking to a colleague or lecturer from their own institution. Four measures were adopted to manage this insider-outsider composition: (1) the first author independently reviewed all coding decisions, category boundaries, and interpretive claims, with points of divergence resolved through discussion; (2) informants are reported by role code only, and no account is linked to a named individual; (3) the emerging model was discussed in a validation focus group that included two external reviewers (see Data Analysis Techniques); and (4) accounts describing institutional challenges were deliberately retained and reported, including institutional caution about risk, the absence of a formal innovation policy at programme level, administrative staff accounts of leadership support for digital transformation not yet translated into concrete action, and an account of an intergenerational vision gap.

Two further aspects of positionality bear on interpretation. First, DRIV-EL is the authors' own synthesis, which creates a risk of interpreting the data in

its favour. This was addressed by not treating the presence of the dimensions as evidence (see The DRIV-EL Framework), by flagging segments that contradicted a definition as anomalies, and by reporting the thinnest dimension and the framework's omission of resource mobilisation. Second, the interviewer's insider status cut both ways. It gave access and familiarity with institutional vocabulary, but participants were speaking to a member of staff, and lecturers, administrative staff, and students may have been more reserved when commenting on senior leadership. Accounts of institutional challenges did appear, from programme heads, the dean, and administrative staff, and they concerned policies and systems rather than individuals. Any such reserve would make the differences between levels reported in the Results, if anything, more cautious rather than overstated.

**Participants of the Study**

The study involved 24 informants selected purposively to represent diverse institutional roles: one foundation chair, one dean, three study programme heads, three lecturers, four administrative staff, eleven active students, and one alumnus. The composition was designed to capture leadership enactment as both exercised and experienced. The proportionally larger student group was deliberate: students are the primary constituency of academic leadership and provide access to experiences not visible from within the leadership tier. Only five informants hold leadership positions (KY, DE, KP1-KP3), and the rectorate is not represented among the 24 informants. Leader conduct is therefore described partly from leaders' own accounts and partly from the accounts of those who experience it. The limited leadership sample has three implications for interpretation. First, claims about leaders' intentions and reasoning rest on five voices, and the foundation level is represented by a single informant (KY); the divergence in accounts of innovation policy is therefore a comparison between one foundation-level account and several programme-level accounts, not between two groups of comparable size. Second, because the rectorate, the level that links the foundation to the faculties, is not represented, the study cannot show at which level the policy described by the foundation chair came to be understood differently. Third, the evidence on risk-taking comes from three leader informants (KY, KP2, and DE), so Dynamism is the dimension most exposed to the small sample. The findings are accordingly framed as leadership enacted and experienced across positions in this case, and the refinements proposed in the Discussion are offered for testing with larger leadership samples. Role-based codes are used throughout: KY (Foundation Chair), DE (Dean), KP1-KP3 (Study Programme Heads), D01-D03 (Lecturers), TK1-TK4 (Administrative Staff), M01-M11 (Students), and AL (Alumnus). Table 3 presents the informant profile and interview log.

Table 3. Profile of Informants and Interview Log by Role Group

| Code | Role | n |
|---|---|---|
| KY | Foundation Chair | 1 |
| DE | Dean | 1 |
| KP1-KP3 | Study Programme Head | 3 |
| D01-D03 | Lecturer | 3 |
| TK1-TK4 | Administrative Staff | 4 |
| M01-M11 | Active Student | 11 |
| AL | Alumnus | 1 |
| Total | | 24 |

*Note. All 24 interviews were conducted face-to-face on campus, in Bahasa Indonesia, by the second author, between April 2025 and June 2026. Individual interview dates and durations were not recorded.*

## Instruments

Data were collected through semi-structured in-depth interviews guided by role-specific protocols addressing four broad areas: entrepreneurial leadership practices, digital innovation in educational processes, the relationship between leadership and digital innovation, and factors supporting or constraining institutional development. Five protocol versions were developed, for institutional and programme leaders (used with KY, DE, and KP1-KP3), lecturers, students, the alumnus, and administrative staff; all five are summarised in the Appendix. Questions were open-ended, and the four DRIV-EL dimensions were not presented as response categories, so that participants described leadership practices in their own terms. Each participant took part in a single interview covering all four protocol areas. Interviews were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia, face-to-face at the University, and transcribed for analysis. The transcript record is close to verbatim for most informants; for some (notably the programme heads and students M10 and M11) it condenses answers into a cleaned summary. Excerpts are therefore quoted as they appear in the transcript record, in the original Indonesian followed by an English translation in square brackets, and words in square brackets inside an excerpt replace details that would identify a programme. Translations were prepared and checked by both authors.

## Ethical Procedures

The study was conducted with formal research permission from both institutions involved. The faculty of the doctoral institution issued a letter of request for research permission dated 22 April 2025. The rector of the

University granted permission by a letter dated 28 April 2025, allowing the research to be conducted from April 2025 on condition that it observed academic rules, research ethics, data confidentiality, and coordination with the units concerned. Fieldwork was carried out under this permission. On 20 June 2026 the University certified that the research had been completed for the period April 2025 to 20 June 2026 and that the researcher had complied with academic rules, research ethics, and the institution's regulations.

The study was not submitted to a research ethics committee; ethical oversight took the form of the institutional research permission described above, which made compliance with research ethics and data confidentiality a condition of fieldwork, and of the host university's certification that these conditions had been met. Participants agreed to be interviewed under the research permission described above, and their responses are reported anonymously by role code.

*Identifiability.* Three informants occupy single-occupant roles (the foundation chair, the dean, and the alumnus), and the three programme heads belong to a small, visible group. Naming the institution would make these participants identifiable. The University is therefore not named, and programme names in excerpts are replaced by generic descriptors in square brackets. Permission documents are available from the corresponding author on request.

**Data Analysis Techniques**

Because the study began from a framework with predefined dimensions and written definitions, the analysis is best described as framework analysis (Gale et al., 2013) with abductive interpretation (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012), not as inductive thematic analysis. Its procedural logic follows Miles et al. (2014), which treats systematic documentation and cross-checking of coding decisions as quality criteria; this is the basis for the inter-author review described below. The analysis proceeded in four stages. (1) *Identification of main ideas:* each transcript was read in full and meaning units were marked. (2) *Conceptualisation:* meaning units were given descriptive codes in participants' own terms, without reference to the four dimensions. (3) *Categorisation:* codes were grouped by similarity into six field categories (vision, strategic thinking, change initiation, change anticipation, future orientation, and flexibility), whose definitions were written and revised until both authors could apply them consistently; the six labels were then applied as a common index to every answer in all 24 transcripts (Table 4). (4) *Charting and interpretation:* each coded segment was charted in a matrix (informant by field category) and examined against the definitions in Table 1. A segment was charted to a dimension when it matched that dimension's definition; segments that matched none, or that contradicted a

definition, were flagged as anomalies. Following abductive logic, these anomalies were treated as the most informative material and are reported explicitly in the Results. NVivo supported data organisation and coding. An anonymised informant-by-category matrix, with the charting of each informant to the four dimensions, is provided as Supplementary File S1.

Two categories, change initiation and flexibility, contributed to both Dynamism and Innovation. To keep the two dimensions distinguishable, a decision rule was applied at Stage 4. A segment was charted to Dynamism when its object was the decision to act: whether, when, and how quickly the institution moved on an opportunity, or how procedures were adjusted to make room to act. It was charted to Innovation when its object was the novelty of a practice: what new curricular, pedagogical, digital, or organizational practice was introduced, and how it was legitimised. Segments meeting both criteria were charted to both dimensions; segments meeting neither (for example, general statements of support or collaboration) were retained as context. Applying the rule, eight informants contributed segments to Dynamism and eleven to Innovation, and three (KY, KP2, KP3) contributed segments to both (Table 5).

Sampling was guided by role diversity rather than by a predetermined saturation target. Redundancy was monitored within role groups: later interviews within the student and administrative-staff groups produced reiteration rather than new concepts, whereas the leadership group was treated as a set of distinct organizational vantage points. The emerging model was then discussed in an online validation focus group (Zoom, 17 June 2026, 09:00-12:00 WIB). Two external reviewers were designated: a lecturer from another private university and a vice-rector of another university. Also present were the doctoral supervisors, one of whom is an author of this paper, and academic staff of the University, among them a dean, programme heads, and lecturers. The panel was therefore not independent of the research team or the case institution. It reviewed the doctoral project's overall model rather than this paper's interpretive framework specifically. Reviewers judged the model usable with minor revisions; the revisions that followed sharpened the wording of the dimension indicators to reduce overlap between dimensions and clarified the role of digital innovation, without changing the four dimensions examined here.

Trustworthiness was addressed through Lincoln & Guba's (1985) four criteria. Credibility was supported by cross-role comparison of accounts and by discussion of the emerging model in the validation focus group; disconfirming accounts were actively sought and retained. Transferability was supported by contextual description of the institution's developmental stage, resource conditions, and governance (see also Limitations). Dependability was supported by inter-author review of coding decisions against the written category

definitions, consistent with the procedural tradition of Miles et al. (2014); disagreements were resolved by discussion and recorded in the audit trail. Confirmability was supported by an audit trail linking transcripts, the coding matrix, category development, and interpretive claims. Figure 1 summarises the analytic sequence.





Figure 1. Data Collection and Analysis Process: Six Field Categories Charted to the Four DRIV-EL Dimensions.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Results

#### *Field Categories and Their Mapping to the DRIV-EL Dimensions*

Six field categories were developed from participants' accounts. Table 4 defines each category and shows the codes, informant groups, and excerpts that support it. Table 5 shows how the categories were charted to the four dimensions. Excerpts are numbered by dimension (D, R, I, V) and are referred to by these numbers in the tables.

Table 4. Field Categories: Definitions, Example Codes, Contributing Informants, and Excerpts

| Category | Definition (as applied in coding) | Example codes (translated) | Informants (n; groups) | Excerpt |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Vision (Visioner) | Statements of where the institution or | 'visionary leadership | 23; all seven groups | V1, V2 |

| Category | Definition (as applied in coding) | Example codes (translated) | Informants (n; groups) | Excerpt |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | programme should go, and of leaders' responsibility for setting that direction | managing the institution innovatively'; 'leaders as designers of the campus direction' | | |
| 2. Strategic thinking (Berpikir Strategis) | Reasoning that links present choices (programmes, staffing, systems) to longer-term goals or external conditions | 'strengthening staff capacity'; 'partnerships to accelerate digital capacity' | 18; all seven groups | V3 |
| 3. Future orientation (Berorientasi ke Masa Depan) | Attention to the future circumstances of graduates and the institution, including careers and technological change | 'digitalisation as a strategy for academic flexibility'; 'graduates ready for work' | 17; all seven groups | V2 |
| 4. Change initiation (Menginisiasi Perubahan) | Accounts of starting something new or moving the institution or a programme in a new direction | 'decision-making based on initiative and risk-taking'; 'competition as an instrument for innovation' | 15; all seven groups | D1, I1 |
| 5. Flexibility (Fleksibel) | Accounts of loosening routines, procedures, or ways of thinking to allow new action | 'flexibility as room to explore'; 'a dynamic and adaptive academic ecosystem' | 17; all seven groups | D3, I2 |
| 6. Change anticipation (Antisipasi Perubahan) | Accounts of foreseeing constraints or disruptions, and of the obstacles met in keeping functions running | 'limited funding for innovation'; 'unstable e-campus system'; 'no formal innovation policy' | 24; all seven groups | R2, R4 |

*Note. Seven role groups: foundation chair, dean, programme heads, lecturers, administrative staff, students, alumnus. Category labels in brackets are those used in the Indonesian coding matrix.*

Table 5. Charting of Field Categories to the DRIV-EL Dimensions

| DRIV-EL Dimension | Field categories (charting rule) | Enacted conduct | Informants (n; role groups) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dynamism | Change initiation; Flexibility (segments whose object is the decision to act on an opportunity, or adjusting procedures to make room to act) | Converting opportunities into institutional action, tempered by organizational caution | KY, DE*, KP1, KP2, KP3, TK1, TK2, M11 (8; 5 groups) |
| Resilience | Change anticipation | Maintaining functions under chronic constraint | All 24 (7 groups); explicit resilience language: KY, KP2, DE |
| Innovation | Change initiation; Flexibility (segments whose object is the novelty of a practice, or openness to experimentation) | Initiating new curricular, digital, and pedagogical practices, with limited institutionalization | KY, DE, KP2, KP3, D01, D02, D03, TK3, TK4, M01, AL (11; 7 groups) |
| Vision | Vision; Strategic thinking; Future orientation | Providing future direction, with incomplete alignment | All 24 (7 groups) |

*Note. KY = Foundation Chair; DE = Dean; KP = Study Programme Head; D = Lecturer; TK = Administrative Staff; M = Student; AL = Alumnus. *DE's account of risk avoidance was coded 'strategic thinking' in the matrix and charted to Dynamism at Stage 4 as an anomaly (see Excerpt D6).*

Two features of the charting require comment. First, Dynamism and Innovation draw on the same two categories; they are distinguished not by the categories but by the object of the coded segment, as set out in the decision rule in Methods. For example, the foundation chair's account of expansion (Excerpt D1) concerns the decision to move on an opportunity and was charted to Dynamism, whereas the account of introducing AI-related content (Excerpt I1) concerns the novelty of a practice and was charted to Innovation. Second, Resilience rests on a single category, change anticipation, which was assigned mostly to answers to the protocol question on obstacles and therefore appears in all 24 accounts. Its breadth reflects the interview design rather than the strength of the Resilience dimension. The Resilience interpretation rests on a narrower subset: explicit resilience language from KY, KP2, and DE, and administrative staff accounts of keeping services running despite system failures. Strategic thinking, charted to Vision, captured reasoning that connected present

choices about programmes, staffing, and systems to the institution's longer-term position.

Evidence was uneven across dimensions. Vision and Resilience categories appear in all 24 accounts, partly because every protocol asked about future direction and about obstacles. Innovation was described by eleven informants in all seven role groups. Dynamism is the thinnest: eight informants in five groups, with no lecturer or alumnus and a single student (M11). Within Dynamism, risk-taking was claimed by the foundation chair, described by one programme head as something to cultivate in students, and reported by the dean as something leaders tend to avoid.

*Dynamism: Converting Opportunities into Institutional Action*

Dynamism was described primarily through initiative, responsiveness to opportunities, and willingness to move beyond established routines. The foundation chair described institutional decision-making in these terms:

> *Pengambilan keputusan kami sepenuhnya didorong oleh inisiatif untuk menangkap peluang dan keberanian mengambil risiko terukur, seperti saat kami melakukan ekspansi agresif sejak 2020.*
>
> [Our decision-making is driven entirely by the initiative to capture opportunities and the courage to take calculated risks, as when we undertook aggressive expansion from 2020 onwards.]
>
> *(Excerpt D1; KY, Foundation Chair)*

The foundation chair linked these decisions to keeping the University's programmes relevant to industry needs and to sustaining institutional growth. At programme level, KP2 described decisions that set students real challenges:

> *Keputusan strategis diarahkan pada pemberian tantangan (challenge) nyata bagi mahasiswa. Contohnya pada Prodi [nama prodi], mahasiswa didorong mengelola event di luar rutinitas [bidang prodi] untuk menumbuhkan keberanian mengambil risiko bisnis dan mentalitas pemecah masalah.*
>
> [Strategic decisions are directed at giving students real challenges. For example, in the [programme], students are encouraged to manage events beyond their routine [disciplinary] activities, to build the courage to take business risks and a problem-solving mentality.]
>
> *(Excerpt D2; KP2, Study Programme Head)*

KP3 described leadership decisions that loosened established patterns to make room for action:

> *Keputusan strategis diwujudkan melalui pemberian ruang fleksibilitas bagi dosen dan mahasiswa untuk bereksplorasi. Institusi melonggarkan rigiditas*

> *pola pembelajaran konvensional demi memberikan tempat bagi inovasi di bidang kewirausahaan.*
>
> [Strategic decisions take the form of giving lecturers and students room to explore. The institution loosens the rigidity of conventional learning patterns to make room for innovation in entrepreneurship.]
>
> *(Excerpt D3; KP3, Study Programme Head)*

Administrative staff described Dynamism at the level of systems, as leaders' attempts to replace an unreliable e-campus platform (TK1, TK2), and a student described leaders as accelerating change through digital tools (M11):

> *Pimpinan sudah berusaha untuk memperbaiki dan mengusulkan penggantian sistem yang lebih baik untuk mendorong sistem dan layanan akademik secara optimal.*
>
> [The leadership has tried to fix it and has proposed replacing it with a better system, so that academic systems and services work optimally.]
>
> *(Excerpt D4; TK2, Administrative Staff)*

> *Pimpinan kampus sangat mendukung adaptasi teknologi, terutama dalam memfasilitasi penggunaan berbagai aplikasi digital untuk menunjang kegiatan akademik dan mempercepat perubahan di lingkungan kampus.*
>
> [Campus leaders strongly support technological adaptation, especially by facilitating the use of various digital applications to support academic activities and to speed up change on campus.]
>
> *(Excerpt D5; M11, Student (transcript record))*

The dean described a limit on Dynamism at the leadership level:

> *Namun, dalam tataran implementasi, masih terdapat kendala pada aspek keberanian mengambil risiko (risk-taking). Di tingkat pimpinan, sering kali muncul kecenderungan untuk terlalu banyak pertimbangan yang berlebihan, sehingga inisiatif perubahan yang bersifat disruptif atau berisiko tinggi cenderung dihindari demi menjaga stabilitas atau keamanan organisasi.*
>
> [In implementation, however, there are still obstacles regarding the courage to take risks. At the leadership level, there is often a tendency toward excessive deliberation, so that disruptive or high-risk change initiatives tend to be avoided in order to preserve organizational stability or security.]
>
> *(Excerpt D6; DE, Dean)*

No lecturer or alumnus account was charted to Dynamism. Apart from the foundation chair's account of calculated risk, no informant described leaders

taking risks; KP2 described risk-taking as something to cultivate in students, and the dean described it as something leaders tend to avoid.

*Resilience: Sustaining Institutional Continuity under Constraint*

Explicit resilience language came from three leaders. The foundation chair described entrepreneurial leadership as requiring enthusiasm, a positive mentality, and toughness (*ketangguhan*) in the face of change; the dean described graduates' resilience; and KP2 named it as a property of the institution's people:

> *Adanya modal manusia berupa generasi dosen dan mahasiswa yang melek teknologi (digital native), memiliki ketangguhan (Resilience), serta kemampuan bertahan hidup (survive) yang tinggi dalam menghadapi perubahan.*
>
> [There is human capital in the form of a generation of lecturers and students who are technologically literate (digital natives), possess toughness (resilience), and have a high capacity to survive in the face of change.]
>
> *(Excerpt R1; KP2, Study Programme Head)*

The constraints against which this capacity was set were chronic and largely material. KP2 named funding as the main obstacle:

> *Kendala utama terletak pada dukungan finansial yang belum mencukupi untuk mendanai pengadaan dan pemeliharaan inovasi teknologi secara berkelanjutan di tingkat universitas.*
>
> [The main obstacle lies in financial support that is not yet sufficient to fund the procurement and maintenance of technological innovation on a sustained basis at university level.]
>
> *(Excerpt R2; KP2, Study Programme Head)*

Administrative staff described their work as keeping operations running for lecturers and students, and the main obstacle as frequent disruptions to the e-campus system:

> *Tanggung jawab saya di sini yaitu mendukung kelancaran operasional dalam kegiatan perkuliahan, membantu mahasiswa dan dosen setiap kendala yang dialami, dan juga membuat surat-menyurat yang dibutuhkan user, baik itu Kaprodi dan juga dekan.*
>
> [My responsibility here is to keep teaching operations running smoothly, to help students and lecturers with every problem they face, and to produce the correspondence that users need, whether programme heads or the dean.]
>
> *(Excerpt R3; TK1, Administrative Staff)*

> *Sering terjadi gangguan atau kendala, yaitu maintenance pada sistem apabila user terlalu banyak yang masuk atau login.*

> [Disruptions often occur, namely system maintenance when too many users log in.]
>
> *(Excerpt R4; TK2, Administrative Staff)*

Students experienced the same constraints from the receiving end, mostly as unstable connectivity (M01-M04, M06, M08, M11):

> *Kendala terbesar adalah jaringan internet yang tidak stabil.*
>
> [The biggest obstacle is the unstable internet network.]
>
> *(Excerpt R5; M03, Student)*

Across these accounts, the participants who described keeping functions running most concretely were administrative staff, whose roles place them closest to day-to-day operations, and the constraints were chronic rather than episodic: no account referred to a single crisis. Infrastructure, connectivity, funding, or staffing constraints were raised by 20 of the 24 informants, in every role group except the alumnus.

*Innovation: From Programme Initiatives to Institutional Practice*

Innovation was described in pedagogical practice, the use of digital technology, curriculum development, and organizational initiatives. KP3 described the main strategy as follows:

> *Strategi utama dilakukan dengan mengintroduksi isu-isu mutakhir seperti Artificial Intelligence (AI). Hal ini bertujuan untuk membuka pola pikir civitas akademika agar lebih adaptif, kreatif, dan terbuka terhadap perkembangan pengetahuan global.*
>
> [The main strategy is carried out by introducing current issues such as Artificial Intelligence (AI). This aims to open the mindset of the academic community so that it becomes more adaptive, creative, and open to the development of global knowledge.]
>
> *(Excerpt I1; KP3, Study Programme Head)*

KP2 described a principle of freedom of thought for lecturers and students, integrating recent developments in science and technology so that learning is not monotonous. Lecturers described learning management systems, video conferencing, online quizzes, and digital teaching materials, and attributed the impetus partly to leadership:

> *Kalau menurut saya pimpinan kampus cukup aktif mendorong inovasi lewat kebijakan dan dukungan terhadap teknologi pembelajaran.*
>
> [In my view, campus leaders are quite active in encouraging innovation through policy and support for learning technology.]
>
> *(Excerpt I2; D01, Lecturer)*

> *Menurut saya melihat pimpinan kampus sudah mulai terbuka terhadap inovasi, terutama dalam hal digitalisasi pembelajaran. Banyak kebijakan baru yang mendukung penggunaan platform digital dari pihak kampus.*
>
> [In my view, campus leaders have begun to be open to innovation, especially in digitalising learning; there are many new campus policies supporting the use of digital platforms.]
>
> *(Excerpt I3; M01, Student)*

Accounts also described a gap between introducing a practice and making it institutional. KP2 reported that hybrid learning had been implemented but was used below its potential, and two programme heads and the dean reported that there was no formal policy for innovation at programme level:

> *Saat ini belum tersedia kebijakan formal di tingkat Program Studi. Inisiatif inovasi masih bersifat personal berdasarkan kesadaran dosen dalam meningkatkan kompetensi Tridarma, karena dukungan sistemik dari kampus belum optimal.*
>
> [There is currently no formal policy at programme level. Innovation initiatives are still personal, based on lecturers' own awareness of the need to improve their competence in the three missions, because systemic support from the university is not yet optimal.]
>
> *(Excerpt I4; KP1, Study Programme Head)*

Two administrative staff (TK1, TK2) reported that leadership support for digital transformation had not yet been translated into concrete action:

> *Sejauh ini belum ada tindak nyata karena kami masih terkendala pada sistem aplikasi e-campus yang mudah gangguan.*
>
> [So far there has been no concrete action, because we are still held back by an e-campus application that is easily disrupted.]
>
> *(Excerpt I5; TK1, Administrative Staff)*

Accounts of formal policy diverged. TK3 reported a decree and circulars requiring use of the digital systems, whereas KP1, KP3, DE, TK1, and TK2 reported no formal policy for innovation or digitalisation, and KP3 attributed the gap to the absence of a central policy from top leadership.

*Vision: Orienting Present Decisions toward Future Institutional Development*

Vision-related categories appear in all 24 accounts. A lecturer described academic leaders as responsible for setting institutional direction:

> *Menurut pendapat saya, Rektor dan dekan mempunyai tanggung jawab seperti arsitek pembelajaran, sedangkan Kaprodi dan dekan menjadi pemimpin*

> *visioner yang mampu merancang arah kampus. Tanpa arah yang jelas dari pemimpin, perubahan sering menjadi wacana tanpa adanya pergerakan.*
>
> [The rector and the dean carry a responsibility comparable to that of learning architects, while study programme heads and deans act as visionary leaders capable of designing the direction of the campus. Without a clear direction from leaders, change often remains discourse without movement.]
>
> *(Excerpt V1; D02, Lecturer)*

The alumnus described leadership as preparing students for a future of technological change:

> *Kampus memberi ruang bagi mahasiswa untuk meningkatkan daya analisis dan mengembangkan kemampuan berpikir kritis. Hal ini penting, apalagi di era sekarang yang sudah banyak mengalami robotisasi dan penggunaan teknologi. Manajemen kampus cenderung mendorong mahasiswa untuk siap beradaptasi [dan] memberi kesempatan berkarier.*
>
> [The campus gives students room to improve their analytical ability and develop critical thinking. This is important, especially now that so much has been robotised and technology is widely used. Campus management tends to encourage students to be ready to adapt [and] gives them career opportunities.]
>
> *(Excerpt V2; AL, Alumnus)*
>
> *Pimpinan kampus berperan penting dalam mendorong inovasi melalui kebijakan pemanfaatan teknologi dan dukungan terhadap pembelajaran yang lebih kreatif dan adaptif.*
>
> [Campus leaders play an important role in encouraging innovation through policies on the use of technology and support for more creative and adaptive learning.]
>
> *(Excerpt V3; M04, Student)*

Direction was not uniformly shared, and the clearest evidence concerns innovation policy. The foundation chair described a formal arrangement:

> *Kami menerapkan kebijakan otonomi inovasi bagi setiap Kaprodi untuk mengembangkan kurikulum yang adaptif dengan kebutuhan industri, didukung oleh insentif berbasis kinerja bagi inisiatif yang berhasil meningkatkan kualitas lulusan.*
>
> [We apply a policy of innovation autonomy for every programme head to develop curricula adapted to industry needs, supported by performance-based incentives for initiatives that succeed in improving graduate quality.]
>
> *(Excerpt V4; KY, Foundation Chair)*

Programme heads described the same arrangement differently (Excerpt I4), and KP3 attributed the gap to the absence of a central policy:

> *Integrasi ini dianggap sangat krusial (skala 9-10), namun realisasinya di tingkat prodi masih terkendala oleh belum adanya kebijakan terpusat dari pimpinan tertinggi yang menaungi sinkronisasi keduanya.*
>
> [This integration is considered crucial (9-10 on a ten-point scale), but at programme level its realisation is still held back by the absence of a central policy from top leadership to coordinate the two.]
>
> *(Excerpt V5; KP3, Study Programme Head (transcript record))*

KP3 also named a further obstacle. Asked about the most significant challenge, KP3 answered:

> *Tantangan utama adalah adanya vision gap atau ketidaksamaan visi antar generasi di lingkungan kampus, yang seringkali menghambat percepatan perubahan.*
>
> [The main challenge is the vision gap, that is, the lack of a shared vision between generations on campus, which often slows the acceleration of change.]
>
> *(Excerpt G1; KP3, Study Programme Head)*

This is the only account of an intergenerational vision gap in the data. KP3 did not say where they stood in relation to it, although elsewhere they described the institution's predominantly young staff as its greatest asset.

Figure 2 summarises the conduct observed for each dimension, together with the constraint described for it.




Figure 2. Observed Conduct and Constraints for Each DRIV-EL Dimension in the Case

### *Institutional Conditions Shaping Enactment (RQ2)*

Table 6 summarises the institutional conditions that participants described as shaping the enactment of each dimension, the dimension or dimensions affected, and the informants who described them.

Table 6. Institutional Conditions Shaping the Enactment of the DRIV-EL Dimensions

| Institutional condition | As described by participants | Dimension (s) shaped | Informants (excerpts) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Organizational caution at leadership level | Excessive deliberation; disruptive or high-risk initiatives avoided to protect stability | Dynamism | DE (D6) |
| Chronic resource constraint (funding, infrastructure, connectivity, staffing) | Funds insufficient to procure and maintain technology; unstable e-campus and internet; shortage of specialist lecturers | Resilience; Innovation | 20 of 24, e.g., KP2 (R2), TK1, TK2 (R3, R4), M03 (R5), KP1 |
| No formal policy for innovation at programme level | Innovation remains personal; no central policy coordinating leadership and digital innovation | Innovation | KP1 (I4), KP3 (V5), DE, TK1 (I5), TK2 |
| Divergent accounts of policy across levels | Foundation chair describes innovation autonomy with incentives; programme heads and dean report no formal policy; staff divided on leadership support | Vision; Innovation | KY (V4) vs KP1, KP3, DE; TK1, TK2 vs TK3, TK4 |
| Generational differences | Lack of shared vision between generations slows change | Vision | KP3 only (G1) |
| Expansion phase since 2020 | Rapid opening of programmes | Dynamism | KY (D1) |
| Regulatory transition (Sept 2025) | Not mentioned by any informant | None reported | - |

*Note. Excerpt labels refer to the numbered excerpts in the Results.*

Two conditions were cross-cutting. Chronic resource constraint shaped Resilience and Innovation at the same time. The divergence between the foundation chair's and the programme heads' accounts of innovation policy

bears both on Innovation, where practices lack a route to institutional adoption, and on Vision, where direction set at foundation level is not described in the same terms at programme level.

### *What the Lens Did Not Anticipate*

Because DRIV-EL guided where the analysis looked, the four dimensions were expected to be found, and their presence is not offered as a result. Four observations were not anticipated by the framework's definitions (Table 1) and are reported here as anomalies in the abductive sense (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012): (a) institutional caution as a counterweight to Dynamism, together with thin evidence of risk-taking by leaders; (b) Resilience visible mainly as staff keeping services running rather than as an attribute of leaders; (c) the gap between programme-level innovation and institutional routine; and (d) divergent accounts of innovation policy between the foundation and programme levels, with one account of an intergenerational vision gap. A further observation concerns an omission in the framework rather than in the data: resource constraints were raised by 20 of the 24 informants, in six of the seven role groups, but DRIV-EL has no dimension for resource mobilisation.

## Discussion

The unit of analysis in this study is leadership conduct, as enacted by leaders and as experienced by others in the University. Two of the findings, however, describe institutional capacity as much as individual conduct: Resilience as continuity work, and Innovation as institutionalization. For these dimensions the relevant literatures are organizational resilience and institutionalization rather than entrepreneurial leadership alone, and the discussion below draws on them accordingly. Throughout, the findings are offered as proposed refinements to DRIV-EL that require testing in other settings, not as general claims; they rest on one institution, one interview per participant, and five leader voices.

Previous conceptualisations of entrepreneurial leadership emphasise opportunity recognition, influence, value creation, and action under uncertainty (Bagheri & Harrison, 2020; Gupta et al., 2004; Renko et al., 2015). The present accounts are broadly consistent with these conceptualisations, but the objects of entrepreneurial action differ in the academic setting: opportunities were pursued through programme development, curriculum adjustment, responses to technological change, and graduate relevance rather than through market entry. This is consistent with the description of universities as settings in which change must be negotiated across loosely coupled units and among professionals (Birnbaum, 1988; Bolden et al., 2009; Weick, 1976).

### *Dynamism: Opportunity Recognition and Organizational Permission to Act*

The accounts locate Dynamism less in leaders' personal speed than in the relationship between initiative and organizational decision structures. Some informants emphasised initiative and calculated risk; others described extended deliberation and the avoidance of disruptive change. One interpretation is that, in an emerging private university where authority over resources is split between the foundation and the academic hierarchy, recognising an opportunity is not sufficient: it must also be authorised and resourced. Ensley et al. (2006) showed that the effect of entrepreneurial leadership behaviour on new venture performance depends on environmental dynamism; by analogy, and only as a proposition, the conversion of initiative into action in a university may depend on internal authorisation conditions as much as on the leader's willingness to move. The thin evidence for risk-taking is itself informative. In a setting with little slack, caution may be a reasonable response rather than a deficit, consistent with Bryman's (2007) review, which associates effective departmental leadership with consulting colleagues and fostering a collegial atmosphere. DRIV-EL's folding of risk-taking into Dynamism may obscure this. We therefore propose that, for universities, Dynamism be specified as a relational capacity linking opportunity recognition to institutional permission to act, and that risk-taking be examined separately rather than assumed.

### *Resilience: Continuity Work under Chronic Constraint*

In the entrepreneurial leadership literature, resilience is mostly associated with the leader's persistence under adversity and capacity to absorb uncertainty on behalf of others (Gupta et al., 2004). The present accounts retain this meaning in the foundation chair's language, but most of the concrete evidence came from programme heads and administrative staff describing how functions were kept running. This brings the finding close to organizational resilience, which Duchek (2020) conceptualises as a meta-capability unfolding in three stages (anticipation, coping, and adaptation), and which Lengnick-Hall et al. (2011) argue is developed by building competences among core employees through human resource management rather than through leaders alone.

The finding differs from that literature in two respects. First, research linking crisis management and resilience distinguishes adversity as a discrete event from adversity as an ongoing process (Williams et al., 2017); the constraints described here belong to the second, chronic kind. Second, what participants described was mainly the coping stage, keeping essential functions running, rather than anticipation or adaptive transformation. We therefore propose that, in this type of setting, the Resilience dimension of DRIV-EL

include the leader's role in enabling continuity work by others, and that it be distinguished from organizational resilience: the former concerns how leadership sustains effort under chronic constraint; the latter concerns the organization's general capability to respond to adversity.

### *Innovation: From Programme Initiative to Institutionalization*

The accounts show innovative practices at programme level with few mechanisms to carry them further. This pattern is consistent with diffusion perspectives, in which introduction does not guarantee adoption (Rogers, 2003), and more directly with institutional theory, which describes institutionalization as moving from habitualization (new practices adopted locally), through objectification (shared recognition of their value), to sedimentation (taken-for-granted continuity) (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). In these terms, most innovations described by participants had reached habitualization but not objectification. From a dynamic capabilities perspective, the capacity to initiate new practices is distinct from the capacity to reconfigure organizational structures around them (Teece et al., 1997).

These perspectives suggest that the Innovation dimension of DRIV-EL, as defined in Table 1, attends to the initiation of new practices but not to the leadership work of moving a practice from habitualization to objectification. We propose this as a refinement for testing: in universities, Innovation may need to be specified to include institutionalization work.

### *Vision: Direction-Setting and Shared Vision*

The accounts suggest that Vision was consequential less as the articulation of a desirable future than as a means of aligning present decisions with it, and that alignment was incomplete. The distinction between a leader's vision and a shared vision, one that members hold as their own, is long established (Senge, 1990), and the transformational leadership literature treats the communication of a collective vision as a core leadership behaviour (Bass & Avolio, 1994). The findings therefore do not show that alignment is a new leadership task. They show where alignment was incomplete in this case: the foundation chair described a formal policy of innovation autonomy with incentives, whereas programme heads and the dean described innovation as relying on personal initiative in the absence of a formal policy.

This divergence is consistent with descriptions of universities as loosely coupled systems, in which a decision taken at one level is not automatically transmitted to others (Weick, 1976). One programme head also attributed slow change to an intergenerational vision gap. Because this rests on a single account, we present it as a direction for further inquiry rather than as a pattern.

### *DRIV-EL as an Integrated Pattern: A Proposition*

The four dimensions can be read as an interrelated configuration: Vision provides direction, Dynamism enables movement, Innovation changes practice, and Resilience sustains the change. The data do not, however, contain cases that demonstrate the interdependencies, for example an initiative that failed for lack of Resilience, or an innovation that drifted for lack of Vision. The configuration in Figure 3 is therefore presented as a proposition for future testing, with the institutional conditions identified in Table 6 shown as the points at which the cycle was observed to weaken.





Figure 3. Proposed DRIV-EL Cycle and the Institutional Conditions Observed to Weaken It (Proposition for Future Testing)

### *Theoretical Implications*

The study proposes four refinements to DRIV-EL, each for testing in other settings rather than as an established extension. For each, the case suggests a mechanism that would explain why the refinement is needed; the mechanisms are inferences from the accounts and are stated so that they can be tested. (1) Dynamism specified as a relational capacity linking opportunity recognition to institutional permission to act, with risk-taking examined separately. The proposed mechanism is split decision rights combined with little slack: where the foundation holds authority over resources and failed experiments are hard to absorb, an opportunity identified at programme level

must be authorised before it can be acted on, and caution becomes a reasonable response rather than a deficit, consistent with Bryman (2007). (2) Resilience including the leader's enabling of continuity work under chronic constraint, distinguished from organizational resilience. The proposed mechanism is chronic rather than episodic adversity (Williams et al., 2017): when constraints persist, the work of keeping functions running shifts to those closest to operations, so that resilience depends on competences among core staff (Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011) and on whether leaders support that work. (3) Innovation including the institutionalization work that moves practices beyond their initiators. The proposed mechanism is the absence of arrangements that would give a local practice shared recognition of its value, the stage Tolbert & Zucker (1996) call objectification, such as a formal policy, a standard procedure, or a budget line; without them, practices remain at habitualization. (4) Vision attending to the alignment of direction across organizational levels as well as to its content. The proposed mechanism is loose coupling (Weick, 1976): where policy described at foundation level is not recognised as formal policy at programme level, direction does not reach programmes in the same terms. The four mechanisms share a source in the conditions set out in the Introduction: little slack, split decision rights, and routines that are still being built. The data also point to a boundary condition of the framework: in resource-constrained settings, the absence of a resource-mobilisation dimension leaves out conduct that participants treated as central. Whether resource mobilisation should be added as a fifth dimension, or treated as a condition cutting across the four, is a question for future work.

### *Practical and Policy Implications*

Four implications follow for foundations and academic leaders in emerging private universities, with the caveat that they derive from a single case. First, to close the gap between how innovation policy is described at foundation level and how it is experienced in programmes, foundations could put innovation autonomy and incentives in writing and review them with programme heads, and could involve junior as well as senior staff in that review. Second, to move innovations beyond their initiators, institutions could establish a simple institutionalization route: a register of programme-level innovations, a periodic review at which promising practices are evaluated, and, for those adopted, a standard operating procedure, a budget line, and an owner outside the initiating programme. Third, because continuity work was carried largely by administrative staff and programme heads, leadership development should include resource prioritisation and the protection of essential services, and that work should be recognised in staff appraisal. Fourth, foundations and rectors

could make explicit which decisions require foundation endorsement, so that opportunities identified at programme level are not lost in deliberation.

The four dimensions can also be used as a set of diagnostic questions rather than as a validated instrument: whether opportunities identified at programme level are authorised and resourced within a reasonable time (Dynamism); who keeps essential functions running under constraint, and whether that work is supported (Resilience); whether programme-level innovations have a route to institutional adoption, such as a standard procedure or budget line (Innovation); and whether the foundation, faculty leaders, and programme heads describe the institution's priorities and policies in the same terms (Vision). The questions are not scored; their purpose is to structure a leadership team's review of where entrepreneurial intent is being lost, and they have not been validated.

### *Limitations*

Several limitations bound the findings. (1) The study rests on a single interview per participant, without observation of leadership practice or analysis of institutional documents, so it captures accounts of enactment rather than enactment itself. (2) Only five informants held leadership positions, none above the dean other than the foundation chair, and the rectorate is not represented; claims about leaders' intentions therefore rest on few voices, and the large student group contributes mainly leadership as experienced rather than as exercised. (3) All interviews were conducted by the second author, a member of the University's staff; although the safeguards described in Methods were applied, insider involvement may have shaped what participants were willing to say, particularly about senior leaders. (4) The study was not reviewed by a research ethics committee but relied on institutional research permission, and individual interview dates and durations were not recorded, so the timing of interviews relative to the 2025 regulatory change cannot be shown. (5) For several informants the transcript record condenses answers rather than reproducing them word for word, and excerpts were translated by the authors, so nuance may have been lost. (6) The validation focus group was not independent of the research team or the institution. (7) Data collection spanned a regulatory transition that no informant mentioned; the study was not designed to detect its effects.

The findings are not statistically generalizable; their transferability depends on how similar other settings are to this one. Readers can judge this against the boundaries of the case: a foundation-governed private university in an expansion phase, with more than a dozen programmes opened largely since 2020, chronic constraints in funding and digital infrastructure, and a national

quality-assurance regime that places accreditation pressure on young institutions. Leaders in other emerging private universities, in Indonesia or in comparable Southeast Asian systems where private institutions depend on tuition and foundation governance, may find the patterns relevant to the extent that these conditions apply. The patterns are less likely to transfer to well-resourced or public universities with stable structures.

### *Future Research*

Three lines of inquiry follow. First, a longitudinal study following a small set of programme-level innovations over two to three years could examine how practices move, or fail to move, from habitualization to institutional routine, and what leadership conduct accompanies each transition. Second, comparative multi-site case studies across private and public universities, and across Southeast Asian regulatory regimes, could test whether institutional caution and continuity work are specific to emerging private institutions. Third, combining interviews with observation of decision meetings and analysis of planning documents could examine directly how policy set at foundation level is understood in programmes, and whether senior and junior staff differ in their priorities. Quantitative work could then develop context-sensitive indicators from the refined dimensions, including resource mobilisation, and test whether they operate similarly across settings.

## CONCLUSION

This study examined how the four DRIV-EL dimensions, used as a sensitizing lens, are enacted in an emerging Indonesian private university, and which institutional conditions shape that enactment. Because the lens guided the analysis, the presence of the four dimensions is not itself the finding. The findings are how each dimension was specified in this setting and what the lens did not anticipate.

Dynamism appeared as the conversion of opportunities into institutional action, tempered by organizational caution, with little evidence of risk-taking by leaders beyond the foundation chair's account. Resilience appeared mainly as administrative staff and programme heads keeping functions running under chronic resource constraint. Innovation was evident at programme level but rarely reached institutional routine. Vision mattered as a means of aligning present decisions with future direction, but alignment was incomplete: the foundation chair and the programme heads described innovation policy in different terms, and one programme head named an intergenerational vision gap. Organizational caution, chronic resource constraint, the absence of formal innovation policy at programme level, and divergent accounts across levels were

the conditions that shaped this enactment. Read together, the dimensions suggest a cycle in which Vision provides direction, Dynamism enables movement, Innovation changes practice, and Resilience sustains the change; this cycle is offered as a proposition.

Theoretically, the study proposes refinements to DRIV-EL for testing elsewhere, each with a proposed explanatory mechanism: Dynamism as a relational capacity that depends on institutional permission to act; Resilience as the enabling of continuity work, distinct from organizational resilience; Innovation as including institutionalization work; and Vision as attending to alignment across organizational levels. It also identifies a boundary condition: in resource-constrained settings, the framework's lack of a resource-mobilisation dimension leaves out conduct that participants treated as central. Practically, the findings point to written and shared innovation policy, an explicit route for institutionalising innovations, recognition of continuity work, and clarity about the foundation's decision rights. As a single case with five leader voices, the study offers these as propositions whose transferability depends on how closely other institutions resemble this one.

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